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This Comment discusses the implementation of “Know Your Customer” (KYC) regulation
and its effect on the international banking system. Part I of this Comment explains general legal
concepts and trends in international money laundering including background of the drug trade,
money laundering process and techniques, and U.S. and international regulatory efforts to combat
the money laundering problem. Part II examines the history and the purpose of KYC principles
and the proposed regulations. Part III maintains that the rejection of the proposed regulations
is appropriate. This Comment concludes that the U.S. government should permit U.S. banks to
self-regulate and that a less specific self-regulatory scheme should be adopted internationally.
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INTRODUCTION
In an effort to fight the War on drugs, the U.S. government
has recruited U.S. banks as agents to track down illicit funds.1 In
1970, the U.S. government enacted legislation that effectively im-
posed an immense burden on U.S. bankers to know their cus-
tomers and to track suspicious transactions. In an already
highly regulated industry, these regulatory requirements may in
fact become a hindrance, rather than an aid, in the fight against
international money laundering3 because of the immense ad-
ministrative and financial burden that these requirements im-
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1. See Thomas D. Grant, Toward a Swiss Solution for an American Problem: An Alterna-
tive Approach for Banks in the War on Drugs, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 227 (1995)
(discussing variety of methods used by wealthy nations to curb effects of money launder-
ing).
2. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
114 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5325 (1994)). The
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act ("BSA") gave the U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury the authority to prescribe reporting limits for currency transactions. Id.
§ 5313(a). Pursuant to that authority, the Secretary of the Treasury requires banks to
report transactions in amounts exceeding US$10,000 via a currency transaction report
("CTR"). 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (1998). The BSA also grants the Secretary of the
Treasury power to require reporting of suspicious transactions and power to impose
anti-money laundering programs on U.S. banks that can include requirements that
banks take measures to know their customers. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (1994).
3. See Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash Cycle: A Guide to
the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 231 (1991) (describing laundering process
consisting of three distinct components: placement-deposit of cash into financial in-
stitution; layering-creating series of transactions through various accounts to disguise
true origin of funds; integration-shifting funds to legitimate organizations with no
apparent link to organized crime).
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pose on financial institutions.4
A large portion of illicitly derived money is generated by the
Latin American drug trade, and Latin American countries are
well-known for the extent of money laundering activity within
their borders.' The use of devices such as payable through ac-
counts6 (or "PTAs") by Latin American clients of U.S. banks
render know your customer ("KYC") principles,7 imposed by
U.S. regulation, virtually useless, as circumvention of these
guidelines is nearly impossible to detect.8
On December 7, 1998, under direction of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury, the Federal Reserve 9 ("Fed"), the Office of
4. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 437 (1994) (discussing immense
financial burden imposed on U.S. financial industry by government regulation, regula-
tory inefficiency, and regulatory ineffectiveness).
5. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez, Money Laundering and Drug Trafficking Controls
Score a Knockout Victory over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INr'L & COM. REG. 235, 238 (1993)
(noting that large portion of laundered money originates in Latin America but signifi-
cant amount of money laundering occurs within borders of United States); see also H.R.
REP. No. 101-446, at 23 (1990) (explaining that border states such as Texas and New
Mexico are subject to large scale money laundering). In 1989, the Federal Reserve of
San Antonio reported in testimony before the Federal Reserve Board of Governors that
a great deal of money laundering activity is occurring along the border with Mexico.
Id. Much of this activity is conducted in unregulated cash exchange houses commonly
known as "Casas De Cambios," which provide foreign exchange services but are tradi-
tionally not subject to banking laws in Latin America and are not closely scrutinized to
prevent illicit funds from entering legitimate financial institutions. Id.
6. See Warning Guidelines Issued to Protect Against Improper or Illegal Use of "Payable
Through" Accounts, Apr. 7, 1995, available in 1995 WL 480501 (F.D.I.C.) [hereinafter
PTA Guidelines] (noting that payable through accounts ("PTAs") are most commonly in
form of checking accounts marketed by U.S. banks to foreign banks that would not
under other circumstances be able to offer their customers access to U.S. banking sys-
tem).
7. See Guidelines for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, available in 1996 WL
271924, at *9 (F.D.I.C.) (Financial Institution Letter) (providing detailed list of know
your customer ("KYC") principles). KYC principles (also known as "guidelines" or "pol-
icies and procedures") require that U.S. banks perform due diligence in obtaining and
maintaining appropriate information on each customer. Id. This type of information
can include the type of business, the length of time that business has been in existence,
and the type of relationships the customer maintains in their business affairs. Id.
8. See Scott Sultzer, Note, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to
Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REv. 143, 189-92 (1995) (discussing use of non-bank financial
institutions, front companies, and PTAs as potent tools to circumvent KYC guidelines
and other money laundering regulation).
9. See CARL FELSENLELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1998).
The Federal Reserve ("Fed") was created by the U.S. Congress in 1913 and acts as the
central bank for the United States. Id. It consists of 12 Federal Reserve banks through-
out the United States and a Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. Id. It is responsi-
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Comptroller of the Currency" ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision" ("OTS"), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Com-
panya2 ("FDIC") released proposed regulations that would codify
specific KYC principles.' 3 On March 23, 1999, in response to
overwhelmingly negative comments, the agencies issued a joint
press release withdrawing the proposal. 4 The concerns raised
by the proposed regulations, however, remain, as KYC principles
are imbedded in the U.S. anti-money laundering regime.' KYC
ble for monetary policy, controlling interest rates, and regulating banks that choose to
be members and use the services of the Federal Reserve System. Id.
10. See id. at 5. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), established in
1862 as part of the U.S. Department of Treasury, regulates nationally chartered U.S.
banks. Id.
11. See id. at 12. The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") charters and regulates
federal savings and loan associations, which mainly serve the function of providing de-
posit services, and providing loan services for home buyers. Id.
12. See id. at 7-8. The Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC") regulates
state banks that choose not to be members of the Federal Reserve System. Id.
13. See Amy G. Rudnick & Linda Noonan, Proposed Know Your Customer Regs Are
Finally Issued, 9 No. 5 MONEY LAUNDEING L. REP. 1, 5 (1998) (discussing implication of
proposed KYC regulation and financial industry's negative response to recent propos-
als); see also John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement After Barings
and Daiwa, 935 PRAc. L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 681, 692
(1996) (discussing formation of multi-agency task force to write specific KYC regulation
after years of agency discussion of need for such KYC regulation).
14. See Joint Statement, Proposed "Know Your Customer" Rule (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.fdic.gov/publish/newprs/1999/prlOI-9914.hmtl> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law'Journal) (stating that agencies' received unprecedented number
of comments reflecting privacy and financial burden concerns).
15. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (1999) (requiring that all banks under OCC supervi-
sion to establish procedures for compliance with BSA, necessarily including establish-
ment of KYC principles needed to address, for example, reporting of suspicious transac-
tions which require knowledge of customers banking habits and typical transactions).
The provision states:
(a) Purpose. This subpart is issued to assure that all national banks establish
and maintain procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor their
compliance with the requirements of subchapter II of chapter 53 of tide
31, United States Code, and the implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder by the Department of Treasury at 31 CFR part 103.
(b) Compliance procedures. On or before April 27, 1987, each bank shall
develop and provide for the continued administration of a program rea-
sonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with the recordkeep-
ing and reporting requirements set forth in subchapter II of chapter 53 of
tide 31, United States Code, and the implementing regulations promul-
gated thereunder by the Department of Treasury at 31 CFR Part 103. The
compliance program shall be reduced to writing, approved by the board
of directors and noted in the minutes.
(c) Contents of compliance program. The compliance program shall, at a
minimum:
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principles, furthermore, have infiltrated the international anti-
money laundering framework.16 It is a prudent time, therefore,
to suggest more appropriate measures to stem the tide of money
laundering, as these principles are both too burdensome on fi-
nancial institutions and are in many ways ineffective.1 7
This Comment discusses the implementation of KYC regula-
tion and its effect on the international banking system. Part I of
this Comment explains general legal conceptsand trends in in-
ternational money laundering including background of the drug
trade, money laundering process and techniques, and U.S. and
international regulatory efforts to combat the money laundering
problem. Part II examines the history and the purpose of KYC
principles and the proposed regulations. Part III maintains that
the rejection of the proposed regulations is appropriate. This
Comment concludes that the U.S. government should permit
U.S. banks to self-regulate and that a less specific self-regulatory
scheme should be adopted internationally.
I. GENERAL CONCEPTS AMD TRENDS IN
MONEY LAUNDERING
Most money laundering today is fueled by the international
(1) Provide for a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compli-
ance;
(2) Provide for independent testing for compliance to be conducted by
bank personnel or by an outside party;
(3) Designate an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating
and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and
(4) Provide training for appropriate personnel.
Id.
16. See Initiative by the Organization of American States to Prepare Model Regula-
tions on the Laundering of Property and Proceeds Related to Drug Trafficking: Arti-
cles Considered by the Inter-American Group of Experts, Dec. 9-13, 1991, OEA/Ser. L/
XIV, 4.4, CIDAD/GT. Lavex/doc. 20/19, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COM-
BAT MONEY LAUNDERING 4 (Dr. W.C. Gilmore ed., 1992) [hereinafter Model Regula-
tions]; see also United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)
[hereinafter 1988 Convention]; Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
(FATF): The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Task Force on Money Launder-
ing, with Interpretive Notes, June 28, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1291, 1293 [hereinafter 1996
FATF Report].
17. See John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really Assist the
Government?, 44 ALA. L. REv. 801, 837 (1993) (arguing that prevention of money laun-
dering through existing regulation does not justify immense financial burden on U.S.
banks and that some BSA reporting requirements have not had effect on money laun-
dering).
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drug trade.' 8 U.S. legislative efforts to combat money launder-
ing not only are centered on reporting requirements found
under the regulations authorized by the Bank Secrecy Act' 9 (or
"BSA"), but also recognize the drug trade as the source of the
problem. 0 Internationally, the measures taken to combat
money laundering have embraced many of the principles found
in U.S. legislation 2 ' and acknowledged that regulation should fo-
cus on the drug trade. 2
A. Money Laundering and the Drug Trade
Although the production, sale, and consumption of illicit
drugs and the need to launder profits from the trade is a rela-
tively recent epidemic, drugs have been used for centuries
through ancient rituals and traditions.21 In the Andean coun-
tries of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, these cultural traditions still
exist, but in addition, the production and export of coca leaf
and processed cocaine is a major source of national income.24
Thus, the governments of these countries have been reluctant to
restrain the coca production and export industries. 25  Even if
18. See Jimmy Gurul6, The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely
Illusory?, 22 Fo.DHAm INr'L L.J. 74, 75-76 (1998) (examining connection between drug
trafficking and money laundering).
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994) (authorizing Department of Treasury to create
transaction reporting requirements that they implemented under 31 C.F.R. § 103.22
(b) (1) (1998)).
20. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C.A. § 841 (a) (1) (1994) (strengthening BSA by creating willful blindness culpabil-
ity standard, making bankers liable for not seeking appropriate detailed information
regarding customer transactions).
21. See, e.g., 1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(b), at 502 (using language
similar to that found in U.S. money laundering legislation).
22. See Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 2 (noting that drug epidemic is ma-
jor issue throughout Latin America and related money laundering problems must keep
drug issue at forefront).
23. See Melanie R. Hallums, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug Control,
30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 817, 823-26 (1997) (describing evolution of coca use and
misuse by examining history of cocaine producing country of Bolivia as example of
more widespread problem of drug production in Latin America).
24. See id. (describing importance of coca industry to economic stability of Andean
region).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 101-991, at 5 (1990) (noting that report concerning U.S.
government's supply side Andean initiative to eradicate drug production in these coun-
tries found that reduction of coca production and processing is of low priority for An-
dean countries). Dependence on the coca economy is so great that governmental inter-
vention to reduce the drug trade would result in such great disruption as to create
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these governments had the desire to impede the drug trade and
money laundering, techniques used to circumvent regulation
such as use of PTAs would make any such intervention difficult
to effectuatey
1. Recent History of the Latin American Drug Trade
Economic hardships in Latin American countries, rather
than cultural tradition, now fuel coca production and process-
ing.27 Without economic relief, the peasant farmers of these
countries lack the incentive to abandon the production of these
products.28 Because the U.S. demand for processed drug prod-
ucts remains consistent despite the so-called War on Drugs, 29 in-
stead of abandoning this lucrative business, producers in Latin
America have become expert businessmen, with economic bene-
fit accruing to some governments. 30 In Colombia, for example,
large and powerful drug cartels are responsible for some of the
social unrest and severe economic dislocation. Id. The socioeconomic and political
climate in the Andean countries is a significant barrier to Andean governments' con-
frontation of the drug trade. Id.
26. See generally Afford, supra note 4, at 439 (discussing variety of techniques used
to circumvent money laundering regulation and costs that such techniques eventually
impose on banks required to detect their use).
27. See H.R. RE. 101-991 at 6 (stating that "[t]he Andean Initiative reflects a...
response to deep-rooted and diverse economic problems" and noting that Andean Initi-
ative Committee found that economic crises in Peru and Bolivia were at root of contin-
ued coca production and processing).
28. Id. There is not even a minimum of incentive for peasant farmers in Andean
countries to abandon coca production absent genuine economic alternatives. Id. Eco-
nomic assistance, therefore, is an important complement to enforcement and interdic-
tion efforts in the Andean countries. Id. In the first year of the Andean initiative, there
was no significant economic assistance to the three Andean countries, and any future
assistance is predicated on meeting counter-narcotics objectives through government
enforcement. Id.
29. See id. at 5 (providing that efforts to eradicate drug production, distribution,
and sale, otherwise known as "War on Drugs," has been ongoing U.S. priority); see also
Gregory Wilson, Note, The Changing Game: The United States Evolving Supply-Side Approach
to Narcotics Trafficking, 26 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1163, 1164-65 (1994) (noting that war
has been in existence for over twenty-five years, was declared by President Nixon, was
escalated by Presidents Reagan and Bush, and continued by President Clinton); H.R.
REP. 101-991, at 5-7 (noting "war on drugs" has been attempt to eradicate drug epi-
demic from supply side through primarily military and law enforcement solutions).
30. See Sharon A. Gardner, A Global Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will Interna-
tionalizing the Drug War Work?, 7 TEMP. Irr'L & COMp. L.J. 287, 291 (1993) (noting that
leaders of drug trafficking industry have made shrewd business decisions and that Co-
lombia has benefitted from economically stabilizing effect of increased national in-
come).
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country's economic success. 3 1 In the 1980s, the infamous Medel-
lin Cartel3 2 ("Cartel") attained so much financial clout that it
became a significant economic power.3 In 1987, the Cartel met
with Colombian government officials and offered to pay off Co-
lombia's national debt and to terminate their involvement in the
drug trade in exchange for the government's refusal to extradite
certain members to the United States. 4 The disruptive nature
of the Cartel on the financial stability of Colombia is evident
from its economic crisis endured throughout the 1980s."5 Due
to the tremendous revenue generated by the drug trade, the in-
ability of supply side measures to stop production,3 6 and no ap-
parent end to the demand for product, laundering of profits
from the drug trade remains a significant international prob-
lem. 7
2. The Money Laundering Process
Legitimizing illicit profits is a problem faced by every drug
trafficker.3 8 To facilitate the legitimization of illicit profits,
money launderers commonly use a three step process: place-
ment, layering, and integration.3 9 Description of this process,
and the techniques used, however, can suffer from over general-
ization as the criminal mind has few limits to its creativity when
faced with law enforcement obstacles.4 °
31. See id. (discussing rise and power of drug cartels in Colombia and their effect
on politics and economy of Colombia).
32. See Wilson, supra note 29, at 1168-76 (detailing history and activity of Medellin
Cartel (or "Cartel"), which is conglomerate of drug traffickers brought together in con-
certed effort to dominate cocaine market and considered at one time to be most power-
ful and notorious international criminal drug operation).
33. See id. at 289 (discussing economic power gained by Medellin Cartel from drug
trade and consequent ability to influence business and politics in Colombia).
34. See id. at 290 (noting that offer also demanded that Colombian government
allow Cartel to invest in Colombian enterprises, but that offer was rejected by Colom-
bian government).
35. See H.R. REP. 101-991, at 6 (1990) (describing economic depression felt by citi-
zens of Colombia, which was in part brought on by various countries' dependence on
illicit drug trade).
36. See id. (finding that Andean region supply reduction programs were ineffective
in reducing production and export of coca products).
37. See Hallums, supra note 23, at 818-19 (commenting on continued demand for
cocaine in United States).
38. Sultzer, supra note 8, at 148.
39. Id.
40. See Timothy H. Ehrlich, Note, To Regulate or Not? Managing the Risks ofE-Money
and Its Potential Application in Money Laundering Schemes, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 833, 835
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Placement is the physical deposit of cash into a financial in-
stitution.4 1 Although the money laundering process has three
steps, it is generally agreed by law enforcement and regulatory
officials that the point at which criminals are most vulnerable to
detection is the placement stage.4 2 Cash accumulated at the ini-
tial point of sale is delivered to intermediary sites controlled by
the criminal organization known as safe houses, then to brokers
who often distribute the cash to import/export businesses.48
Brokers then use wire transfers and structure the transaction to
avoid threshold reporting requirements.44 Next, the businesses
deposit the money into a financial institution under an appar-
ently legitimate business name.45 Conversion of illicit proceeds
to a medium that is either more convenient or less suspicious for
purposes of exchange, such as property, cashier's checks, or
money orders, completes the placement stage.46
The next step in the money laundering 'process is layering,
which is the movement of funds from one financial institution to
a series of others through a variety of complex transactions in-
tended to disguise the original source.47 For example, layering
can be achieved by wire transferring funds through offshore
banking havens."a Adding more complex layers in this stage can
(1998) (discussing three step money laundering process in context of electronic finan-
cial transactions).
41. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 232 (noting that drug trade is cash and carry busi-
ness with profits from street sales in bills of small denominations, usually twenties or
less, and that since drug trade is estimated to gross over US$100 billion dollars per year,
it would be difficult to have such deposits go undetected)..,
42. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, Note, Combating Illicit Narcotics Traffic in Taiwan: The
Proposed Money Laundering Control Act, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 210 (1996) (dis-
cussing consensus among law enforcement officials that placement is most susceptible
stage of process to detection because it is where funds are most easily linked to original
source); see also Meltzer, supra note 3, at 232 (noting that because placement is most
vulnerable stage in process, this is where force of legislation in United States, and inter-
nationally, has been directed).
43. Ehrlich, supra note 40, at 836.
44. Id. Under federal regulation, financial institutions are required to file a Cur-
rency Transaction Report ("CTR") for any transaction of US$10,000 or more. 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.22 (b) (1) (1998). Additionally, individuals must file a Report of International
Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments if more than US$10,000 enters or
leaves the United States in any manner. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994).
45. Ehrlich, supra note 40, at 836.
46. See Lee, supra note 42, at 210 (discussing instruments that make illicit funds
appear legitimate as they leave placement stage of money laundering process).
47. See id. (commenting on integration stage of money laundering process).
48. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 150 (noting that off-shore banking havens include
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be achieved through use of an off-shore bank.49 Once the
money is deposited into off-shore bank accounts in countries
with strict bank secrecy laws, its source becomes increasingly dif-
ficult to trace. °
Finally, integration occurs when the funds are transmitted
to legitimate operations with no link to their illicit origin.5' The
variety of legitimate and illegitimate instruments used in this
phase include traditional monetary instruments, such as letters
of credit, bank notes, and debt and equity securities. 2
3. Money Laundering Techniques
Money laundering techniques range from simply exchang-
ing small bills for larger bills in day-to-day commerce for the pur-
pose of easier transport, to the establishment by launderers of
small boutique banks to accept illicit funds.53 These boutique
banks in turn deal with larger correspondent banks at the place-
ment stage.54 To avoid currency reporting requirements, laun-
derers wire funds internationally into U.S. banks, which have his-
torically been ill-equipped to distinguish clean wired money
from money illicitly derived.55 Still other launderers have moved
countries with traditional customer secrecy laws such as Cayman Islands, Panama, Baha-
mas, and to lesser extent todiy, Switzerland and Pakistan).
49. See David D. Beazer, The Mystique of "Going Offshore," 9 UTAH Bus. J. 19 (1996)
(explaining variety of financial transactions conducted through off-shore banking oper-
ations in effort to avoid tax and regulatory scrutiny). Broadly defined, an off-shore
bank conducts banking and financial transactions in a foreign jurisdiction with
favorable tax and regulatory conditions. Id. at 19.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 98-907 (1984) (describing difficulty of obtaining records
from banks in highly unregulated countries and increasing difficulty when more than
one foreign jurisdiction is involved).
51. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 151 (noting that integration can be achieved
through variety of avenues including use of wire transfers from one financial institution




55. See Bill McConnell, In Focus: Technology, Cooperation Needed to Stem Growth of
Financial Crimes, AM. BANKER, Mar. 4, 1996, vol. 161, no. 42, at 1 (reporting that simple
record keeping procedures are inadequate when faced with "criminals' sophistication
and technical prowess"); see also CARL FELSENFELD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER 173 (1988) (stating that "[t]he rapidly evolving techniques of electronic com-
munication creates a constant series of new risks with consequent opportunities for
tampering of all sorts"). But see Gilda I. Mariani, New Federal Regulations Assist Money
Laundering Prosecutions, 1997 FIN. CRIMES REP. 10, 10-11 (1997) (commenting on rules
that will make wire transfers subject to stricter reporting requirements).
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into the non-bank financial institution56 marketplace to launder
funds.57 For example, other popular and effective techniques in-
clude payable through accounts, 58 front companies, 9 and loan
back agreements.60
One of the more recent, effective, and troublesome devel-
opments in money laundering is the use of the payable through
account.61 A PTA is an account established in a U.S. bank, usu-
ally by a foreign bank, through which the foreign bank's custom-
ers conduct banking transactions.6 2 The customers of the for-
eign bank can generally transfer funds by writing checks at their
own bank that are payable through the U.S. bank,63 wire funds,
and carry on most banking activities as if they were a direct cus-
tomer of the U.S. bank.64 These accounts gained favor with in-
ternational banks as it became more difficult for foreign banks
to gain approval to operate in the United States in the wake of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International money launder-
56. See Money Laundering Trends Highlight FATF Report, 7 No. 7 MONEY LAUNDERING
L. REP. 1, 7 (1997) [hereinafter Money Laundering Trends] (noting recent trend of
money launderers moving away from banking to non-banking sector, most notably to
currency-exchange businesses, which provide financial services but have less stringent
regulatory controls than banks and less KYC emphasis).
57. Sultzer, supra note 8, at 155.
58. See PTA Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining that PTAs, in general, are
checking accounts marketed to foreign banks that otherwise would not be able to offer
customers with access to the U.S. banking system); see also Money Laundering Trends,
supra note 56, at 7 (noting that PTAs provide foreign banks customers with access to
U.S. banking system without being subject to KYC guidelines).
59. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 156 (noting that money launderers set up fictitious
import/export companies that use services of U.S. banks to conduct business).
60. See Money Laundering Trends, supra note 56, at 7 (describing loan back agree-
ment as vehicle whereby money launderer deposits illicit funds in foreign bank and
uses deposit as collateral for loan from U.S. bank, both cleansing funds and receiving
tax benefits).
61. See Christine M. Taylor, Finding Laundering Perils, Fed Cracks Down on 'PTAS, '3/
1/95 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, available in 1995 WL 8353434 (describing Federal Re-
serve Board's instructions on how banks should handle "latent money laundering men-
ace" of PTAs).
62. Id.
63. See Swiss Style Banking in Montana, 6 No. 7 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 3 (1996)
(noting that check writing facility at U.S. bank allows foreign customers to maintain
anonymity by circumvention of KYC requirements).
64. See FDIC Launches First Crackdown on Payable-Through Accounts, 1/1/96 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, available in 1996 WL 8687165 [hereinafter Crackdown on PTAs]
(describing elements of PTAs, noting that Fed believes that risk of illegal conduct
through use of PTAs is great and that banks should create system that will enable it to
identify ultimate end users).
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ing case.6" U.S. regulators have become concerned that PTAs
will be used by money launderers to circumvent the KYC pro-
grams of U.S. banks.6 6 The U.S. government is aware and con-
cerned with this problem, and in March 1995 the FDIC
presented guidelines for banks to follow concerning the use of
PTAs by their foreign clients.67
B. U.S. Money Laundering Regulatory Scheme
Current regulatory efforts addressing issues such as PTAs
find roots in the BSA, passed by Congress in 1970 under the
title, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.68
The financial community labeled this act, and commonly refers
65. See United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1417 (l1th Cir. 1992) (providing
extensive factual background of Bank of Credit and Commerce International money
laundering investigation). The Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI")
case involved an undercover sting operation where government agents presented them-
selves as legitimate businessmen and began conducting transactions through the
Tampa, Florida branch of BCCI. Id. at 1417-19. After conducting seemingly legitimate
transactions for a period of time, the agents informed bank personnel that the money
was derived through illegal activity. Id. at 1420. The central focus of the government's
case was that the bank had failed to report that the client had come forward with this
information and continued to conduct the banking relationship. Id. at 1422. The bank
and the bankers were charged with knowingly participating in a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, money laundering, and conspiracy to defraud the government. Id. at 1422-23.
The bank plead guilty instead of facing trial and agreed to forfeiture of assets derived
from their criminal activity. See United States v. BCCI Holdings, 1992 WL 100334
(D.D.C. 1992).
66. See Crackdown on PTAs, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that because of concern over
improper uses of PTAs, regulators have issued instructions to banks as to handling of
such accounts and Fed issued "guidelines" for operation of PTAs).
67. See PTA Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4 (commenting that PTAs have been used
for some time in United States by credit unions, e.g., for checking account services, and
investment companies, e.g., for checking account services associated with money mar-
ket management accounts, to provide their customers with all of banking services that
would be offered by commercial banks). The problems with foreign PTAs are unre-
lated to these traditional uses. Id. The PTA guidelines state:
In those situations where (1) adequate information about the ultimate users of
the payable through accounts cannot be obtained; (2) the U.S. banking entity
cannot adequately rely on the home country supervisor to require the foreign
bank to identify and monitor the transactions of its own customers; or (3) the
U.S. banking entity is unable to ensure that its payable through accounts are
not being used for money laundering or other illicit purposes, it is recom-
mended that the U.S. banking entity terminate the payable through arrange-
ment with the foreign bank as expeditiously as possible.
Id.
68. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14, 5316-25 (1994).
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to it as, the Bank Secrecy Act.6 9 Amendments to, and supple-
ments of, the BSA throughout 1980s and 1990s changed the fo-
cus of the act in some respects, but it remains the centerpiece of
U.S. money laundering regulation.7 °
1. Bank Secrecy Act
The BSA, as originally enacted, required banks to maintain
certain records and reports, thus creating a paper trail useful to
law enforcement agencies investigating criminal, regulatory, and
tax evasion schemes in which monies were being hidden from
government scrutiny.71 The BSA sought to regulate foreign
transactions of U.S. citizens attempting to avoid tax and regula-
tory authority by sheltering funds in offshore bank secrecy
havens.7 2 Subsequent to the BSA, legislation was developed to
prevent the laundering of proceeds from the international drug
trade by imposing civil penalties for violation of the BSA and
imposing record keeping on U.S. banks for certain international
funds transfers.73 Congressional findings revealed the belief that
by making the laundering process more difficult, it would inhibit
organized crime operations that rely on the cleansing of illicit
profits." Today, however, the routine record keeping and re-
porting requirements of numerous legitimate transactions can
69. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 801 (noting that BSA was not originally designed to
combat money laundering).
70. SeeJohn J. Byrne et al., Examining the Increase in Federal Regulatory Requirements
and Penalties: Is Banking Facing Another Troubled Decade?, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 40-41
(1997) (examining detrimental effects and confusion in banking industry as result of
BSA amendments and explaining that some amendments are inconsistent with original
goals of BSA established in 1970).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394 (dis-
cussing need for adequate record keeping to aid law enforcement efforts to combat
financial crimes).
72. See Byrne et al., supra note 70, at 40-41 (commenting that when originally en-
acted portion of legislation relating to foreign transactions essentially revolved around
sheltering of monies subject to taxes in Swiss banks); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 3
(discussing testimony by U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for South-
ern District of New York, U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Department of Defense, and Agency for Interna-
tional Development indicating widespread use of foreign financial facilities located in
secrecy jurisdictions to circumvent U.S. law).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 101-446, at 29-35 (1990) (noting that proposed amendments
to Depository Institution Money Laundering Act of 1990 would enhance enforcement
of BSA by making banks liable for negligent conduct in adhering to record keeping
requirements).
74. See 144 CONG. Rac. H9474-01, H9477 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1998) (noting that
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take bankers away from more serious attempts to address money
laundering in their institutions.75 Subsequent legislation, aimed
at the prevention and detection of money laundering, particu-
larly resulting from the drug trade, has widely expanded the
BSA.
7 6
a. Legislative History of the Bank Secrecy Act
Prior to enactment of the BSA, law enforcement officials re-
alized that the large sums of cash deposited into the U.S. bank-
ing system were becoming increasingly difficult to trace, and
brought this problem to the attention of legislators.77 Law en-
forcement officials made the inability to trace the source of such
large deposits a public issue when they identified a need to cre-
ate a structure that would enable them to track these funds,
which they believed had criminal origin.7' The U.S. Department
of Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
U.S. Department of Justice lobbied Congress to draft legislation
that would provide bank record keeping requirements to aid the
fight against organized and white collar crime.79 In response to
this need, legislation was proposed in both the U.S. House of
Representatives ° and the U.S. Senate.81
money laundering is lifeblood of drug traffickers and that efforts to eliminate drug
problem must address flows of illegal funds).
75. See Byrne et al., supra note 70, at 65 (examining ineffectiveness of some bur-
densome reporting requirements put on banks and explaining that banking industry
has been forced to bear financial costs to address social problem of drug money at
expense of addressing issues in their own institutions).
76. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994) (criminalizing structuring of transactions in
attempt to avoid threshold reporting requirements of US$10,000 under BSA); see also
Meltzer, supra note 3, at 255 (commenting on changing nature of money laundering
and consequent need for legislation to be fluid).
77. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 152 (discussing law enforcement officials' realiza-
tion that organized crime and growth of drug trade were generating large deposits of
cash into U.S. banks, which subsequently were laundered, prompting need for legisla-
tion).
78. Charles W. Blau, The US. Bank Secrecy Act: A Federal Tool in the Prosecution of
Federal Crimes, in SEMINAR ON "BANK SEcREcY Acr AND BANK FRAUD STATUTES" 20 (1989).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394 (not-
ing that regulatory agencies are often frustrated in attempts to investigate international
financial crime due to use of financial secrecy laws applicable to foreign banking insti-
tutions operating in United States).
80. See id. at 16 (noting that Rep. J. William Stanton and Rep. Wright Patman
opposed BSA legislation that came out of House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency). The committee, however, reported favorably on the bill and recommended
that it pass. Id. at 1.
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After the House of Representatives agreed on a bill, Sen.
William Proxmire proposed a similar bill, with subtle alterations,
which were further debated in the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency. 2 Many advocates representing the law en-
forcement community came before the Senate committee as wit-
nesses in full support of the proposed legislation."3 Advocates
for the law enforcement community were aware of concerns that
the banking industry would have with the bill, but, from the law
enforcement perspective, the legislation directly addressed the
problem and needed no alterations to serve their purposes.8 4
The hearings and debates, however, revealed several
problems that implementation of this legislation would present
to the banking community.8 5 The most prominent of these
81. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings ofjune 8, 1970] (not-
ing that Sen. William Proxmire, member of Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, sponsored BSA legislation in Senate). In Senator Proxmire's opening remarks to
the Senate subcommittee, he spoke volumes about the mood of the more conservative
establishment of the United States when he stated that "[w]e are concerned, and prop-
erly so, about maintaining order in our cities and on our campuses." Id. "The problem
of affluent, adult hypocrisy, delinquency, and crime is no less important." Id. Little
debate as to whether there should be legislation can be found in the legislative history
of the BSA, although some particulars were debated. See H.R. REP. 91-975, at 16 (stat-
ing views of Representative Patman, who felt photocopying provision of bill should be.
changed).
82. Hearings ofJune 8, 1970, supra note 81, at 1-35.
83. See id. at 57 (statement of Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions) (stating that "[m]y con-
cern and my responsibility is the enforcement of the Federal Criminal laws. Regarding
S.3678 entirely from that position I can state unequivocally that the legislation before us
would provide additional ammunition in the fight on organized crime and white collar
criminals").
84. See id. at 73 (statement of Carl W. Desch, former Senior Vice President, First
National City Bank) (commenting that Mr. Wilson "urged that we not burden legiti-
mate business with unnecessary redtape. Our purpose . . .should be to detect and
prosecute crime, not build a mountain of paper."). This concern would later become
one of the central issues in the debate concerning to what extent the banking industry
should be responsible not only for record keeping, but also for knowing their custom-
ers. See generally Alford, supra note 4, at 437-39 (discussing immense financial burden
that BSA puts on banks).
85. Hearings of June 8, 1970, supra note 81, at 73 (statement of Carl W. Desch).
Advocating for the banking industry, Carl W. Desch, former Senior Vice President, First
National City Bank, identified five problem areas:
1. The unmistakable potential for invasion of privacy.
2. The existence of provisions which we believe could adversely affect the
strength of the dollar.
3. The almost unprecedented breadth of the regulatory discretion entrusted
to the Secretary of the Treasury.
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problems were concerns over the invasion of clients' financial
privacy 6 and a severe burden that the legislation would impose
upon banks to maintain voluminous records.87 Workable solu-
tions to these problems were suggested and alternative statutory
language was proposed for legislative consideration. 88 Law en-
forcement concerns, however, finally outweighed the burden to
financial institutions because Congressional leaders felt that the
cost to banks was not significant.8 " In addition, some Congres-
sional leaders believed that it was the civic duty of banks to bear
these costs and that in the end this approach would be in the
banking industry's best interest.90
The House bill on bank secrecy included a laundry list of
requirements.91 The Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency hoped to avoid this laundry list, but the alternative was to
give more authority to the Department of Treasury.9 2 The policy
that the Senate adopted did in fact give the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury broad and sweeping powers to promulgate regula-
tion.93 Although no precedent for this power existed at the
4. The operational difficulties, and even impossibilities, which could be cre-
ated by some of the bills provisions.
5. The possible adverse effects of the bill on the trading in, and the market
for, American securities.
Id.
86. See generally Hernandez, supra note 5, at 245 (discussing lack of privacy rights
under BSA, which unlike secrecy law in other countries, is invasive rather than support-
ive of privacy).
87. See Grant, supra note 1, at 266-67 (examining ineffectiveness of BSA require-
ments, which cost U.S. bankers estimated US$10.7 billion in 1991).
88. Hearings of June 8, 1970, supra note 81, at 73 (statement of Carl W. Desch,
former Senior Vice President, First National City Bank). On behalf a consortium of
banks known as the New York Clearinghouse Association, Mr. Desch attached a paper
to his statement before the subcommittee that included suggested changes to the lan-
guage of the bill. Id. Although considered, the final version of the bill did not include
these suggestions. Id.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 11 (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394 (not-
ing that Rep. Wright Patman's view on microfilming of checks was that it was not signifi-
cant cost factor).
90. See id. (reporting that Representative Patman believed that banks should bear
costs imposed by BSA legislation as part of their civic duty to combat crime and in
addition, that effectiveness of bill in reducing expense of battling criminal activity could
result in savings to insured banks).
91. See id. at 12-14 (noting that list included reports for domestic and foreign cur-
rency transactions, margin requirements for extension of credit under federal securities
laws, and persons required to file reports).
92. Hearings of June 8, 1970, supra note 81, at 73 statement of Carl W. Desch.
93. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994). The statute states:
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time, Congress felt that the problem warranted the granting of
such power.94 Congress granted this power to the Treasury De-
partment because the intricacies of regulation in this area re-
quired certain expertise and resources that the Treasury Depart-
ment was uniquely suited to deliver.95
b. Implications of Bank Secrecy Act
To promulgate regulations pursuant to the power granted
under the BSA, the Secretary of the Treasury created a task force
that consulted with both private and public sector representa-
tives in the financial community to determine exactly what types
of records should be retained.96 The Secretary of the Treasury
granted authority to the task force to create the details of the
regulations, and the task force determined specific criteria such
as the photo-copying of checks.9" The task force completed its
study, finding, for example, that only "on us"98 checks in excess
of US$100 were needed to serve the purpose of law enforce-
When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the pay-
ment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other mone-
tary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount, de-
nomination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the Secre-
tary prescribes by regulation, the institution and any other participant in the
transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction at
the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes. A participant acting for an-
other person shall make the report as the agent or bailee of the person and
identify the person for whom the transaction is being made.
Id.; see California Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (examining legislative
history of BSA and stating that "there is no denying the impressive sweep of the author-
ity conferred upon the Secretary by the Bank Secrecy Act").
94. See Hearings ofJune 8, 1970, supra note 81, at 73 (statement of Carl W. Desch)
(noting that intricacies of problem demanded attention from centralized source and
that U.S. Department of Treasury was best equipped to achieve this goal).
95. See id. (explaining that because Department of Treasury had significant re-
sources and expertise in banking affairs, it was granted authority to determine what
records would be useful and how much information they should contain, and to what
extent that information must be maintained); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a)(1)-(4) (pro-
viding details of record keeping requirements that were determined necessary by U.S.
Department of Treasury).
96. See Hearings to Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-64 (1972) (noting input from private sector
provided government with important insight into practical issues in implementing BSA
requirements).
97. Id.
98. See L. RICHARD FISCHER, THE LAw OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY. A COMPLIANCE GUIDE
§ 4 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that these are checks drawn on or payable by bank).
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ment.9  The Secretary of the Treasury then implemented the
specific suggestions determined by the task force."'
The banking industry's compliance with the record keeping
and other requirements under the BSA was inconsistent; thus,
the BSA had minimal impact throughout the 1970s and 1980s.1 °1
Additionally, as feared by the banking industry, the BSA Cur-
rency Transaction Report 0 2 (or "CTR") requirement imposed a
substantial administrative as well as financial burden upon U.S.
financial institutions. °10 The hardship imposed on banks and
the subsequent ineffectiveness of the legislation largely resulted
from the sheer number of CTRs filed each year.104 In addition,
the effectiveness of the reporting requirement is questionable as
evidenced by the ratio of criminal prosecutions to the number of
CTRs filed, which is poor at best.10 5
2. Additional U.S. Money Laundering Legislation
Congress has consistently addressed the ineffectiveness of
the BSA and responded to the changing nature and capabilities
99. See California Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 34 n.5, 6 & 7 (1974)
(describing, in detail, specifics suggested by task force and implemented by Secretary of
the Treasury).
100. Id.
101. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 154 (commenting that adherence to reporting
requirements was so poor during 1970s and 1980s that most cost effective way to place
large sums of cash into banking system was simply to walk into bank and to dump it
onto bankers counter).
102. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (b)(1) (1998) (describing CTR, also known as IRS
Form 4789, as primary document required under BSA to be filed by banks whereby
disclosure of customers' identity, source of funds, and other pertinent information is
recorded for transactions made for benefit of one account on single day in aggregate
amount of US$10,000).
103. See Alford, supra note 4, at 461 (noting that in 1989, cost of such reporting
was estimated to be US$129 million and that these costs are significant burden to finan-
cial institutions, but they are not end of regulatory costs imposed on banks); see also
Byrne, supra note 17, at 817-18 (reporting that estimates of costs of record keeping for
funds transfers under BSA run as high as US$200 million per year, but that this figure
may not accurately reflect true costs incurred as many bankers simply did not know how
to estimate costs and others calculated estimate excluding such categories as fixed
costs).
104. See Afford, supra note 4, at 457 (noting that from 1970 through 1994 over
thirty million CTRs had been filed and that financial institutions estimate that each
CTR takes approximately twenty minutes to complete with cost of filing ranging from
$3 to $15 per filing).
105. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 820 (noting that in one five-year period, IRS
agent in Greater Northwest region reported only one criminal prosecution had been
initiated by review of CTR).
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of organized crime and the burdens imposed on banks.1" 6 To
address BSA noncompliance and the ineffectiveness of CTR fil-
ings, Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986107 ("MLCA"), which imposed criminal liability upon indi-
viduals who structured transactions1 8 or attempted to structure
transactions for the purpose of avoiding the filing requirement
of the BSA. 10' The MLCA sets fines and prison terms for those
106. See Alford, supra note 4, at 456-62 (discussing variety of U.S. legislation aimed
at enhancement and complement to BSA).
107. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-26 (1994)).
108. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (c) (2) (1998) (defining structured transactions to in-
clude multiple transactions made by one person, or on behalf of any individual person,
in excess of US$10,000 on one day).
109. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994). This section of the BSA, which address the structur-
ing of transactions, states:
(a) Domestic coin and currency transactions.-No person shall for the pur-
pose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313 (a) or 5325 or
any regulation prescribed under any such section-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to
file a report required under section 5313(a) or 5325 or any regula-
tion prescribed under any such section;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a
report required under section 5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation pre-
scribed under any such section that contains a material omission or
misstatement of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial insti-
tutions.
(b) International monetary instrument transactions.-No person shall, for
the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5316-
(1) fail to file a report required by section 5316, or cause or attempt to
cause a person to fail to file such a report;
(2) file or cause or attempt to cause a person to file a report required
under section 5316 that contains a material omission or misstatement
of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any importation or exportation of monetary instruments.
(c) Criminal penalty.-
(1) In general.-Whoever violates this section shall be fined in accord-
ance with title 18, U.S. Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years,
or both.
(2) Enhanced penalty for aggravated cases.-Whoever violates this sec-
tion while violating another law of the United States or as part of a
pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-
month period shall be fined twice the amount provided in subsection
(b) (3) or (c) (3) (as the case may be) of section 3571 of title 18, U.S.
Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
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directly involved or aid in the structuring process." In addi-
tion, this act prohibits financial transactions involving the pro-
ceeds of specified unlawful activities, the international transpor-
tation of criminal proceeds, and monetary transactions in prop-
erty constituting or deriving. from proceeds obtained from
criminal offenses."' It also requires reporting of suspicious
transactions" 2 to government officials."'
To buttress the BSA and MLCA, Congress enacted the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989'14 ("FIRREA"), and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970 has also been used for this pur-
pose. '1 FIRREA provides for imprisonment of up to twenty
years per count for specified violations, sets forth stringent sen-
tencing guidelines, and calls for severe civil penalties." 6 The
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Shockey, supra note 13, at 717 (characterizing suspicious transactions as
transactions that may be irregular or abnormal for particular customer). But see Byrne
et al., supra note 70, at 61 (discussing lack of uniformity and clarity as to what defines
suspicious transaction).
113. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (1994). This section also provides an exemption from
liability from any U.S. law or regulation for directors, employees, officers, or agents of
financial institutions for disclosure of such transactions. Id. § 5318(g) (3).
114. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
1811-1835 (1994)). The statute in pertinent part states:
(j) Criminal Penalty.-
Whoever, being subject to an order in effect under subsection (e) or (g),
without the prior written approval of the appropriate Federal financial in-
stitutions regulatory agency, knowingly participates, directly or indirectly,
in any manner (including by engaging in an activity specifically prohibited
in such an order or in subsection (e) (6)) in the conduct of the affairs of-
(1) any insured depository institution;
(2) any institution treated as an insured bank under subsection (b) (3) or
(b) (4), or as a savings association under subsection (b) (8);
(3) any insured credit union (as defined in section 101 (7) of the Federal
Credit Union Act);
(4) any institution chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971; or
(5) the Resolution Trust Corporation,
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000, imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both.
Id.
115. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, Title II, § 401, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Star. 1260, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
116. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73 (1989); see Robert S. Bennett et al., Taking It to the Banks: The Use of the
Criminal Process to Regulate Financial Institutions, 109 BANKING L.J. 28, 30 (1992) (com-
menting on comprehensive enhancements to BSA through related banking legislation
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Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act11 7 has
been interpreted to subject drug-related criminal activity to a
strict culpability standard of willful blindness.118
Under the MLCA and Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act, financial institutions could conceivably be
liable for any dealings that they have with criminal entities if they
do not conduct a detailed investigation into their clients crimi-
nal history.119 The increased number of CTRs filed in the wake
of the MLCA and the prosecutions that followed indicate that
the noncompliance issue has lessened.12 0
Money laundering offenses are also covered under the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988.121 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act increased
the reach of the U.S. anti-money laundering efforts beyond its
own borders in two ways. 122 It orders the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury to negotiate with finance ministers of foreign countries
to establish an international currency control agency, which will
serve as central source of information, collect and analyze CTRs
filed by its members, and encourage the adoption of uniform
money laundering acts. 123 Further, this act directs the Secretary
of the Treasury to negotiate with foreign financial supervisory
agencies that conduct business in U.S. currency to reach agree-
ments that will ensure that they keep records and provide acces-
sibility to these records by U.S. law enforcement officials. 1 24 The
and noting civil penalties for violation of FIRREA are up to US$1,000,000 per day per
violation).
117. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 951 (1976) (holding that where defendant is aware of facts indicating high
probability of illegality but purposely fails to investigate on account of desire to stay
ignorant, there is knowledge of illegality).
119. See Alford, supra note 4, at 457 (noting that banks face dilemma of either
investigating each customer's transactions or facing liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1957).
120. See United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 836 (1st Cir. 1990) (up-
holding conviction in District Court for District of Puerto Rico of bank president for
felony offenses stemming from failure of bank to file required currency transaction
reports); see also Byrne, supra note 17, at 818-19 (noting that in 1991, 7.4 million CTRs
were filed and in 1992, 9.2 million were filed).
121. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1509 (1994 & Supp. 1997)) (supporting multilateral
efforts to control money laundering including establishment of international organiza-
tions to monitor currency movements).
122. Hernandez, supra note 5 at 273-74.
123. 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1994).
124. Id.
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United States has reached agreements that include the US
$10,000 reporting threshold of the BSA with a number of coun-
tries based on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.1 25 Additional amend-
ments give the President of the United States the authority to
terminate banking relations with any country that refuses to ne-
gotiate. 126 All of this additional legislation, however, has not re-
duced the costs to the financial industry in any way, and its effec-
tiveness is questionable.12 v
C. International Regulation of Money Laundering
Since the early 1980s, the global concern regarding drug
trafficking and money laundering has become a prominent issue
on the international landscape. 128  The monetary costs attrib-
uted to international money laundering are staggering, 129 and
the social costs of money laundering are immense. 130 Interna-
tional banking and monetary regulation, an evolving and dy-
namic area of international law,' remains hotly debated and is
125. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 274 (noting that these countries include
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Mexico,
Thailand, and Netherlands).
126. 31 U.S.C. § 5315.
127. See Laura M.L. Maroldy, Note, Record Keeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop
the Money Cycle: Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic Transfers Is Not
the Answer, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1991) (arguing that specifically tailored
reporting requirements are ineffective).
128. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 235-36 (remarking that as of 1993, drug prof-
its estimated at US$300 billion are laundered through international banking system
each year, that illegal drug proceeds from U.S. drug sales generate about US$110 bil-
lion, and that because these figures are so alarming, international cooperation has
grown in effort to curb drug trafficking).
129. See 144 CONG. REc. H9474-01 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1998) (noting that U.S. Con-
gress's findings concerning Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998 included esti-
mate of US$500 million laundered internationally every year); see also Ricardo A. Peller-
ano & EduardoJorge, Money Laundering Rules in the Dominican Republic, 114 BANKING L.J.
136 (1997) (claiming that estimates suggest that international money laundering may
be in tens of billions of dollars per year); Morgan, supra note 30, at 25 (asserting that
between US$100 billion and US$300 billion in U.S. currency is involved in money laun-
dering each year).
130. See Morgan, supra note 30, at 25 (noting that as of 1991, U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Agency found U.S. citizens spent less money on national defense than on drugs,
drug prevention, drug rehabilitation, and drug education).
131. See William M. Berenson, Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banking, 29 GEO.
WASH. J. Irr'L L. & EcoN. 337, 338-39 (1996) (discussing prominent nature of interna-
tional banking and continuing need to address issues in field both practically and aca-
demically).
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the focus of many international regulatory efforts. 132
1. The International Response to U.S. Money
Laundering Regulation
Detractors of the BSA and its progeny claim that U.S.
money laundering regulation is too intrusive and violates the
customers right to financial privacy. 133 Some countries explicitly
reject U.S. money laundering regulation because the require-
ments are not practical, effective, or cost efficient.13 ' For in-
stance, the Canadian government came to the conclusion that
the U.S. reporting system generates too much paper, results in
excessive delay in providing the information to law enforcement,
provides insufficient evidence of its value, and is too costly and
highly intrusive. 35
On the other hand, an increasing number of foreign gov-
ernments have enacted laws making money laundering a crime
132. See id. at 339 (commenting that money laundering is one of many unresolved
issues of significant importance to international banking community). Among the
other relevant issues that are directly related to money laundering are bank secrecy,
regulation versus competition, and electronic bank transfers. Id.
133. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 245 (discussing intrusion into financial pri-
vacy of U.S. citizens in wake of BSA enactment). Clients' privacy rights in this country
are recognized and protected by the Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA"). 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-22 (1994). The RFPA was passed in an attempt to halt the erosion of privacy
rights and to re-institute privacy protections. Hernandez, supra note 5, at 245. Contra-
dictory to those goals, the RFPA simply sets out the procedures whereby the govern-
ment can obtain personnel financial records. 12 U.S.C. § 3403. It allows the govern-
ment to obtain financial records by written consent of the customer, with a search war-
rant, by administrative subpoena, by formal written request, by judicial subpoena, or by
grand jury subpoena. Id. § 3404-06.
134. See Byrne et al., supra note 70, at 41 (noting that countries rejecting some
portion of U.S. reporting system include United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan).
135. See id. at 42 (discussing Canada's view of record keeping requirements). The
Canadian government later decided to adopt record keeping requirements for transac-
tions in excess of US$10,000. Id. In 1990, a U.S. Senate report named Canada, Switzer-
land, the Bahamas, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Panama as the most frequently used
jurisdictions for the laundering of drug trade proceeds originating in the United States.
See Drug Money Laundering Banks and Foreign Policy, A Report on Anti-Money Laundering
Law Enforcement and Poliy Before the Subcomm. on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Op-
erations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990) (commenting that proximity and interchanging
of currencies at Canadian border are prime reasons for large volume of money launder-
ing activity); see also John L. Evens, International Money Laundering: Enforcement Challenges
and Opportunities, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 195, 200-01 (1996) (commenting that Can-
ada's inclusion with other money laundering countries is not because they share tradi-
tional bank secrecy laws that others employ; rather, they are subject to large scale
money laundering largely because of shared border with United States as well as being
largest trading partner of United States).
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and have required their financial institutions to retain and to
review transactions in a similar fashion as in the United States. 1 36
The Dominican Republic, like the United States, has enlisted the
help of its financial institutions in the war on money laundering
by recently adopting anti-money laundering laws. 137 This devel-
opment was particularly important because most illicitly derived
money generated today emanates from the drug trade occurring
in Central and Latin America.' 38  The Dominican Republic,
along with other Caribbean nations, has entered into agree-
ments with the United States to assist in the drug war.' 39 Indeed,
the Dominican Republic was one of the first countries in the
Latin American region to make money laundering a crime and
has recently enhanced its money laundering rules.1 40
In addition, many tenets of U.S. money laundering legisla-
tion are incorporated in international agreements such as the
Inter-American Commission Against Drug Abuse's' 4 1 ("CICAD")
Model Regulations ("Model Regulations") .142 CICAD took into
136. See Mariani, supra note 55, at 12 (discussing increase in foreign financial insti-
tutions' compliance with standards comparable to those under U.S. money laundering
regulation).
137. See Pellerano & Jorge, supra note 129, at 136 (commenting on Dominican
Republic's implementation of BSA-type laws, which while only addressing money laun-
dering associated with proceeds of drug trafficking, are broadly defined under Domini-
can law and impose substantial deterrence to financial institutions that violate them).
The penalties range from RD$100,000 to RD$250,000 and in some cases, a financial
institutions license may be canceled. Id.
138. See id. at 136 (commenting that Caribbean and Latin American countries are
ideally situated for drug trafficking and money laundering because of their proximity to
drug source and U.S. banking system).
139. See id. at 137 (explaining that these agreements, known as "hot pursuit" agree-
ments, have allowed U.S. Coast Guard to enter territorial waters when following suspect
under certain circumstances).
140. See id. at 137-38 (remarking that these enhancements were influenced by Fi-
nancial Action Task Force ("FATF"), formed by G-7 nations of Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States in effort to affect governments'
policies on variety of financially related issues).
141. See Inter-American Program of Action of Rio dejaneiro Against the Illicit Use
and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic' Substances and Traffic Therein,
Apr. 1986 (extracts), ch. IV (1), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY
LAUNDERING 4 (Dr. W.C. Gilmore ed., 1992 (recommending formation of Inter-Ameri-
can Commission Against Drug Abuse ("CICAD") and giving CICAD responsibility for
developing, coordinating, evaluating, and monitoring measures prescribed by Program
of Action and for submitting proposals for prevention of drug abuse and trafficking in
region); see also Sultzer, supra note 8, at 212 (noting that CICAD is organization formed
within Organization of American States ("OAS"), whose membership includes almost
all nations in Western Hemisphere).
142. See Model Regulations, supra note 16.
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consideration the Forty Recommendations143 adopted by the
twenty-six nation Financial Action Task Force 1 4 ("FATF"), an or-
ganization that attempts to influence governments on a range of
financially related issues."' The Model Regulations adopted es-
sentially incorporate KYC policies to prevent the opening of
anonymous accounts and threshold reporting limits similar to
those found under the BSA.146
2. International Regulatory Efforts
Divergent legal, historical, and cultural norms present many
barriers to efficient international regulation. 147  Unlike U.S.
bank secrecy and money laundering legislation, which is an aid
to government enforcement of drug policy, many other coun-
tries have implemented bank secrecy laws with the purpose of
protecting client confidentiality. 48 Although the international
community has continually responded to money laundering is-
143. See 1996 FATF report, supra note 16.
144. See id. (noting that FATF was formed in 1989 as intergovernmental body
whose purpose is development and promotion of policies to combat money launder-
ing).
145. See Sultzer, supra note 8, at 211 (commenting that FATF has been very active
in developing and promoting anti-money laundering initiatives among its members and
has been source for development of regional organization directed at similar purposes
such Caribbean Financial Action Task Force).
146. See Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 10, 12.
147. See Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial
Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-Laundering Policy, 19 BRooK. J.
INT'L L. 871, 874-76 (1993) (examining problems such as divergent asset-forfeiture law,
common law versus Napoleonic code, and cultural difference exemplified in contrast
between Islamic law and Western law); see also Protecting Business Assets from Fraud in
Financial Dealings in Latin America, LATIN Am. L. & Bus. REP., available in 1997 WL
9499057 [hereinafter Dealings in Latin America] (asserting that fact-gathering techniques
used in United States are almost nonexistent or have limited use in many Latin Ameri-
can countries and that Latin American banking customers are not accustomed to regu-
lations intruding on personal financial privacy).
148. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 236 (discussing history of traditional bank
secrecy law and inherent conflict with current money laundering legislative efforts); see
also Geoffrey W. Smith, Competition in the European Financial Services Industry: The Free
Movement of Capital Versus the Regulation of Money Laundering, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
101, 124 (1992) (noting that countries with laws focusing on individuals' privacy rights
tend to attract larger number of deposits from drug traffickers who wish to keep their
financial affairs private). Countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Monaco, Hong Kong,
the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, Gibraltar, and the Bahamas exemplify secrecy and tax
havens that attract money launderers as well as legitimate business. "Id. One of the
three largest financial secrecy havens in the world is Luxembourg, which has roughly
US$160 million in foreign deposits in about 120 banks. Id.
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sues through entities such as the United Nations and FATF, the
problem persists. 1
49
a. The United Nations
In the fifty-four years since its inception, the United Nations
has sought to be a facilitator for peace, cooperation, and resolu-
tion of conflicts within the international community. 150  The
U.N. Charter clearly reveals this purpose.' 5' To this end gener-
ally, and to achieve the common international goal of eradicat-
ing the problems surrounding money laundering from the drug
trade specifically, the United Nations has provided a forum for
significant international cooperation concerning money laun-
dering.152 In the early 1980s, as the power of the drug cartels
became more pervasive and their methods became increasingly
sophisticated, a need for more exact and stringent international
measures arose." 3 In the late 1980s, the United Nations recog-
nized the increasingly international scope of the drug trade with
the 1987 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit
Traffic 154 ("1987 Conference") and the 1988 U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
149. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Annual Report 1995-1996,
11/1/96 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 39, available in 1996 WL 10360795 (examining continu-
ing problems associated with international drug trade and money laundering).
150. See generally Jost Delbruck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global
Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277 (1997) (commenting on expanding poten-
tial of United Nations to play significant role in effort towards globalization).
151. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (stating that "[t]he Purposes of the United Nations
are: [t]o maintain international peace and security . . .; [t]o achieve international
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or hu-
manitarian character... ; [and] [t]o be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations
in the attainment of these common ends").
152. See Hallums, supra note 23, at 836-43 (recounting history of U.N. efforts to
aid in eradication of drug trafficking and related international offenses); see also United
Nations: International Law Commission Report on the Draft Articles Adopted at its
Forty-Third Session, Sept. 11, 1991, ch. 2, art. 25, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1554, 1593 (not-
ing that International Law Commission's draft articles of Draft Code of Crimes against
Peace and Security of Mankind, Commission specifically lists illicit traffic of narcotic
drugs and related financial crime as one of these offenses).
153. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'y 387, 390 (1990) (discussing historical background of U.N. efforts to regulate drug
trafficking).
154. United Nations International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffick-
ing: Decisions of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.133/12, U.N. Sales No. E87.I.18,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1637 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Conference].
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stances ("1988 Convention").
The 1987 Conference did not specifically focus on money
laundering crimes related to the drug trade; rather, it focused
on supply side interdiction'56 and called for attention to the il-
licit demand for drugs and drug treatment. a5 7 The 1987 Confer-
ence also acknowledged the financial incentives to poor farmers
to cultivate illicit crops in drug producing counties. 158 In the
end, the proposals from this conference were general in nature,
but focused on a multifaceted approach to control the drug
trade.' 5 9
Two predecessors of the 1988 Convention, the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs16° and the 1971 Pyschotropic
Substances Convention, 16 1 are used to regulate the legal produc-
tion and distribution of controlled substances for medical and
scientific purposes and made all other production illegal.162
These measures, however, did not provide the basis for the type
of comprehensive action needed to curtail the illicit drug
trade. 163 As a result, in 1987 the United Nations formed the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs'64 (or "Commission") for the
purpose of formulating a more comprehensive, long-range ap-
155. 1988 Convention, supra note 16; see Hallums, supra note 23, at 837-39 (exam-
ining history of U.N. narcotic control efforts including analysis of 1988 convention).
156. See generally Wilson, supra note 29, at 1163-1206 (surveying history and meth-
ods of combating drug trafficking at Latin American source including asset attachment,
military interdiction, and anti-money laundering legislation such as BSA).
157. See 1987 Conference, supra note 154, at 1666-1706 (outlining variety of sup-
ply-side measures such as identifying narcotic plants and elimination of illicit planting,
disruption of major trafficking networks, and strengthening border patrols).
158. See id. at 1647-65 (providing for preventative measures such as assessment of
extent of drug use and misuse and drug abuse education).
159. See id. at 1644 (announcing that application of recommendations in 1987
Conference implies participation of many branches of national governmental machin-
ery including legislatures, authorities concerned with education, public health, eco-
nomics, and law enforcement).
160. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964).
161. Convention on Pyschotropic Substances, Feb. 2, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976).
162. See Stevart, supra note 153, at 390 (discussing details of 1961 and 1971 con-
ventions and commenting that lack of attention to illicit drugs left gap in international
regulatory efforts).
163. Id.
164. See 1987 Conference, supra note 154, at 1723 (recognizing important role of
United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs as policy making entity within United
Nations on drug control matters).
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proach to the illegal drug problem at the international level. 165
The Commission soon recognized that these conventions were
adequate in their regulation of licit production and distribution
of controlled substances, but they lacked effective mechanisms
for controlling international drug trafficking.166 Accordingly,
the U.N. General Assembly resolved that the U.N. Commission
on Narcotic Drugs draft a new convention to supplement and
reinforce the 1961 and 1971 conventions. 16 7
The resulting draft became the 1988 Convention,168 which
was a more comprehensive and concerted effort by the United
Nations to establish international norms aimed to address the
international drug trafficking issue. 6 9 The 1988 Convention
calls for party states to take specific law enforcement measures
designed to prevent and to punish international drug traffick-
ing. 170 More specifically, it addressed financial crimes related to
the trade. 171 Through the use of language included in certain
U.S. money laundering statutes, 171 the 1988 Convention re-
quired the criminalization of money laundering in party
165. See Stewart, supra note 153, at 390 (commenting on U.N. focus on forward
looking solutions to issues emanating from international drug trade).
166. Id.
167. U.N. GAOR No. 39/41 (1984).
168. See GurulM, supra note 18 (detailing elements and effects of 1988 Conven-
tion).
169. Stewart, supra note 153, at 390-91.
170. See 1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1), at 500 (requiring party states to
enact domestic money laundering legislation).
171. Id. art. 3(1)(a), at 501.
172. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a) (1) (1994) (providing criminal liability for know-
ingly engaging in financial transaction with proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
with intent to promote carrying on of specified unlawful activity or with design of con-
cealing nature, location, source, ownership, or control of proceeds), with 1988 Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 3(1) (b), at 501 (providing that knowing conversion of property
derived from illicit activity or disguise of illicit activity for purpose of avoiding legal
ramification is criminal offence). The provision of the convention establishes criminal
liability for the following offenses:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is de-
rived from any offence or offences established in accordance with subpar-
agraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such of-
fence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit
origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal conse-
quences of his actions;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposi-
tion, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing
that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in
1999] KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER REGULATIONS 2351
states.173  The 1988 Convention was a significant and specific
step aimed at the drug trafficking and money laundering activi-
ties that have had the greatest international impact.1 74 For ex-
ample, the 1988 Convention requires party states to enable their
courts, or other competent authorities, to mandate the produc-
tion of bank and financial records needed to trace and identify
proceeds derived from illicit drug traffic, notwithstanding bank
secrecy laws.175
b. FATF
The 1988 Convention's specificity and comprehensiveness
influenced the next step towards comprehensive and uniform
international regulation, which came from FATF.I 7b In the spirit
of the U.N. initiatives, FATF adopted a multi-disciplinary ap-
proach to money laundering issues, bringing together the policy
making power of legal, financial, and law enforcement ex-
perts.177 FATF's membership consists of twenty-six countries and
two international organizations.1 78 Since its inception, FATF has
accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of
participation in such an offence or offences.
1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(b), at 501.
173. 1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(b), at 501.
174. See Stewart, supra note 153, at 392-93 (noting that "core" offenses covered
under Article 3(1) of 1988 Convention are thought to be "the cornerstone of the Con-
vention"). These offenses include:
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences estab-
lished in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an
act of participation in such offence or offences;
(ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I
and Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the
illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or Psycho-
tropic substances;
(iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the
offences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic
drugs or Psychotropic substances illicitly;
(iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any of
the offences established in accordance with this article.
1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(c), at 501.
175. See 1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(3), at 501.
176. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 147, at 888-89 (discussing influence of 1988
Convention on FATF's Forty Recommendations, most significantly, recommending
criminalizing money laundering).
177. 1996 FATF Report, supra note 16, at 1293.
178. See id. at 1293, n.1, 2. (listing twenty-six FATF member countries and govern-
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issued reports containing suggestions aimed at combating
money laundering problems. 79
In 1990, FATF issued its Forty Recommendations on Money
Laundering, which made broad suggestions, such as improving
national legal systems, 8 ° enhancing the role of the financial sys-
tem in reporting and monitoring suspicious activity,' 8 ' and
strengthening international cooperation. 1 2 FATF further rec-
ommended criminalizing the laundering of money derived from
drug trafficking as proposed by the 1988 Convention. 8 3 The re-
port also suggested international implementation of KYC poli-
cies and BSA reporting requirements in place in the United
States. 1
84
In 1996, FATF issued a revision of its Forty Recommenda-
tions, taking into account the experience gained over the inter-
vening six years and reflecting the changes that had occurred
concerning money laundering. 1 5 These revised recommenda-
tions, however, acknowledge that the FATF countries have di-
verse legal and financial systems.' 86 Blanket recommendations
aimed at universal regulations applicable to all countries may
prove more disruptive to some countries than others because
not all banking and financial systems are of equal quality. 187 Fur-
thermore, banking over-regulation is a drain on the domestic
ments, which are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and United States, and two organizations, which are European Com-
mission and Gulf Cooperation Council).
179. See id. at 1291.
180. See id. at 1294-95 (stating Recommendations 4-6).
181. See id. at 1297 (stating Recommendations 14-19).
182. See id. at 1299-1300 (stating Recommendations 30-40); see also Zagaris & Cas-
tilla, supra note 147, at 876 (discussing cooperative international agreements based on
Forty Recommendations).
183. Compare 1996 FATF Report, supra note 16, at 1294 (stating Recommendation
4, that each country should take measures to criminalize money laundering as set forth
by 1988 U.N. Convention), with 1988 Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1), at 500 (rec-
ommending that money laundering be criminalized).
184. 1996 FATF Report, supra note 16, at 1293.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1294 (noting that FATF acknowledges that diversity of countries that
it addresses will make it impossible for all countries to take identical measures).
187. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International
Banking Supervision, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing risks associated with global
economy, which may disrupt macroeconomic performance).
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economies of some countries.1 8 The recommendations, there-
fore, permit flexible implementation, allowing countries to ap-
ply the principles within their own political, legal, and financial
framework.1 89 Although the 1996 FATF report clarified the orig-
inal Forty Recommendations by issuing interpretive notes along
with this revision, it left them substantially unchanged and the
suggestions included within the Forty Recommendations con-
tinue to provide a universally applicable legal framework for
countries to combat international money laundering.19 °
c. Basle Supervisory Committee
The Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices1 91 ("Basle Committee") is an organization formed by
the world's most influential capitalist countries to provide a fo-
rum for discussion of international banking issues and to help
guide their respective banking regulatory systems. 192 In 1988,
the Basle Committee, in response to the growing risks associated
with money laundering in the increasingly globalized banking
industry, adopted a statement of principles aimed at the issues
surrounding money laundering.9 3 This statement established
188. See Darren McDermott, Hints of a Recovery in Asia Stir Debate over Readiness -
How Much Suffering Will Heal a Sick Economy?, 10/22/98 AsAN WALL ST. J. 1, available in
1998 WL-WSJA 12989003 (quoting Robert Zielinski, a Lehman Brothers banking ana-
lyst, who stated: "The crisis is finally starting to force the sort of changes the Japanese
economy needs, stripping away excessive regulation and improving financial management
.... ") (emphasis added).
189. See 1996 FATF Report, supra note 16, at 1294 (explaining belief that flexibility
of Forty Recommendations should neither infringe upon any countries constitutional
framework nor limit freedom to engage in legitimate financial transactions).
190. Id. at 1293-94.
191. See Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices: Revised
Basle Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 22
I.L.M. 900, 901 (1983) (noting that Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Su-
pervisory Practices ("Basle Committee") has representatives from Belgium, Canada,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States).
192. See id. at 900 (noting that in 1975, Bank for International Settlements, which
later became known as Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,
was created in recognition of growing interdependency of international banking system
and operation of world economy). The Basle Committee was formed to promote coor-
dination and cooperation among banking supervisors in the industrial countries to fos-
ter a sound international banking system. Id.
193. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision: Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking
System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering, reprinted in International Economic Law Docu-
ments, I.E.L. 11-0018 (1988) [hereinafter Statement of Principles]; see Lee, supra note 187,
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an ethical code of conduct for central bank supervisors aimed at
the prevention of fraud and money laundering.'94 It outlined
basic policies and procedures designed to help bank regulators
prevent criminals from using the banking system to launder
money and to preserve the integrity of the international banking
community.'95 The Basle Committee explicitly suggested that
banks should attempt to discover the true identity of their cli-
ents, i.e., adhere to KYC principles.'9 6
In 1992, the Basle Committee issued its Report on Mini-
mum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking
Groups and Their Cross-border Establishment'9 7 ("Minimum
Standards") to emphasize the need for more consolidated super-
vision. 9 ' The Minimum Standards set forth guidelines that pro-
vided to a host country's banking regulators the right to obtain
information from international banks.' 99 Under the standards,
if the host country determines that an international bank fails to
meet the standards, then the host country's regulators may im-
pose sanctions against the bank.200
Although the Basle Committee's Minimum Standards have
improved the international regulatory landscape, they do not
at 1-13 (discussing background and history of international banking regulation and role
of Basle Committee).
194. Statement of Principles, supra note 193, pmbl, cl. 4, at 2.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.; see Kavita Natarajan, Note, Combating India's Heroin Trade Through Anti-
Money Laundering Legislation, 21 FouRDHm IT'L L.J. 2014, 2029 (1998) (providing back-
ground discussion of Basle Committee recommendations).
197. Basle Committee Report on Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International
Banking Groups and Their Cross-border Establishment, reprinted in International Economic
Law Documents, I.E.L. 1I-I (1992) [hereinafter Minimum Standards].
198. See Lee, supra note 187, at 21 (noting that consolidated approach of Mini-
mum Standards is rooted in Basle Committee's revision of Basle Concordant on Princi-
ples for Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments ("Concordant"), issued in 1983).
The revised Concordant focused on ensuring that no bank could escape adequate su-
pervision. Id. The Concordant developed responsibilities of the home and host coun-
tries aimed at a duel regime of supervision. Id. For a detailed summary of the Basle
Committee's Minimum Standards, see id. at 21-22.
199. See Minimum Standards, supra note 197, at 3 (establishing that supervisory au-
thorities in host country should establish understanding with authority in home country
providing that each may gather information needed for effective home-country supervi-
sion to be accomplished either by on-site examination or by other means satisfactory to
host country).
200. See id. (explaining that host country may impose restrictive measures needed
to comply with Minimum Standards, including prohibiting international banks from
creating banking establishments).
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have treaty force and have no binding effect on the participating
countries.2 1 The Minimum Standards rely solely on the moral
authority and informal pressure of the regulators of the partici-
pating countries.202 Reliance on countries to enforce the Mini-
mum Standards unilaterally makes the goal of uniform interna-
tional regulation difficult to realize.20 3
d. The Organization of American States
The Organization of American States 204 ("OAS") is a mul-
tinational organization designed to develop peace in the Ameri-
cas. 205  The OAS established the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission to draft model regulations concerning
money laundering control and the problems associated with the
illicit drug trade.20 6 In May 1992, the General Assembly of the
OAS adopted the Model Regulations Concerning Laundering
Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Of-
fenses ("Model Regulations") .207 The Model Regulations have
no binding effect on the internal legal systems of OAS member
countries, 2 8 but the General Assembly of the OAS urged mem-
ber countries to adopt the Model Regulations in their domestic
201. See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regula-
tory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 CEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241, 271 (1992)
(commenting that non-binding effect notwithstanding, Minimum Standards are signifi-
cant improvement over existing international banking regulation).
202. See id. at 270-74 (noting shortcomings of Minimum Standards, which include
varying degrees of regulatory scrutiny in different countries making information diffi-
cult to obtain, and lack of adequate resources to implement Minimum Standards on
cross-country basis).
203. Id.
204. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The Organization of American States
("OAS") is the world's oldest regional organization, with its origin dating back to 1890
with the First International Conference of American States where the International
Union of American Republics was established. Id. at 981. Adoption of the OAS charter
followed the end of World War II, transformed the Union of American Republics into
the OAS, and was adopted in 1948 in Bogota, Colombia. Id. It was entered into force
on December 13, 1951, at the Ninth International Conference of American States. Id.
Thirty-two Member States ratified the charter since adoption in Bogota. Id.
205. Id. art. 1, at 989.
206. See CHARLES INTRiAGO, INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 3842 (1991) (ex-
plaining initiatives of OAS directed at eradication of money laundering and related
crimes in Latin America).
207. Model Regulations, supra note 16; see Afford, supra note 4, at 453 (comment-
ing on adoption of Model Regulations in order to implement previous regional resolu-
tions, as well as 1988 U.N. Convention).
208. See OAS Charter, supra note 204, art. 1, at 989 (noting that OAS has only
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legislation to create binding obligations. 2°9 The OAS took into
consideration the forty recommendations of FATF and gome ba-
sic tenets of the BSA when drafting the Model Regulations.210
For example, the Model Regulations require banks to file cur-
rency transaction reports much like those required under the
BSA.211
One of the more prominent problems associated with inter-
national regulation of money laundering, particularly in Latin
America, are lax banking standards regarding customer identifi-
cation and record keeping.212 These lax standards may in part
be due to the weak banking systems in Latin America 211 with lim-
ited resources available to combat money laundering.2 4 The
Model Regulations specifically address the need to strengthen
standards universally by incorporating elements of the BSA into
its provisions. 215 For example, Article 10 of the Model Regula-
tions requires that financial institutions accurately identify cli-
ents and maintain records for at least five years. 216 Article 11
emphasizes that financial institutions must provide records to
competent authorities and suspend all bank secrecy laws that
may impede investigation. 217  Articles 12 and 13 incorporate
powers granted by charter and no power to intervene in internal matters of Member
States).
209. Afford, supra note 4, at 454.
210. See Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 12 (requiring records of cash trans-
actions be recorded if they exceed limits set by competent authorities); see Alford, supra
note 4, at 456 (noting that Model Regulations require financial institutions to provide
information to law enforcement and require reporting of currency transactions).
211. Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 12.
212. See Dealings in Latin America, supra note 147, at 1 (noting discretionary nature
of record keeping and lack of uniform accounting procedure in Latin America); see also
Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 147, at 920 (noting that Ecuadorian government enacted
anti-money laundering laws that made money laundering criminal but failed to imple-
ment KYC policies or suspicious transaction reporting).
213. SeeJudith Evans, Contendirs, or Pretenders? (Latin American Equity Markets), 1/
11/97 LATINFINANCE 20, available in 1997 WL 10930636 (commenting on weakness of
banking systems as bar to expansion of capital markets and stating that "[i]n Latin
America, generally speaking, banks are part of the problem, not part of the solution").
214. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 147, at 963 (discussing inability of some
Latin American countries to implement effective anti-money laundering schemes due
to limited resources).
215. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (b) (1) (1998) (requiring CTR filings), with Model
Regulations, supra note 16, art. 12 (requiring filings materially similar to CTR).
216. Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 12; see Paulina L. Jerez, Note, Proposed
Brazilian Money Laundering Legislation: Analysis and Recommendations, 12 Am. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'v 329, 346-47 (1997) (providing detailed analysis of Model Regulations).
217. Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 11.
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threshold reporting requirements and encourage banks to focus
attention on suspicious transactions. 218  Finally, Article 15 re-
quires mandatory compliance programs aimed at employee hon-
esty, KYC principles, and regular audit checks.21 9
The Model Regulations are important to Latin American
countries because the regulations complement Latin American
civil and common law legal systems.2 20 While the Model Regula-
tions are not binding, they serve as a suggested statutory frame-
work designed to facilitate the adoption of anti-money launder-
ing legislation in countries that do not have the resources to de-
velop their own legislation. 22 ' The regulations provide a vehicle
that allows Latin American countries to implement anti-money
laundering regulations in their respective domestic law sys-
tems.22
2
e. International Treaties and Agreements
The principles articulated in the U.N. conventions, FATF's
Forty Recommendations, the Minimum Standards, and the
Model Regulations moved closer to becoming binding law when,
in 1990, the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru entered
into the Declaration of Cartagena'2 2 3 an agreement that would
lay the framework for future binding agreements to combat drug
trafficking and money laundering.224 The Declaration of Carta-
gena embraced the multi-faceted approach 225 suggested by both
218. Id. arts. 12-13.
219. Model Regulations, supra note 16, art. 15.
220. SeeJerez, supra note 216, at 348 (commenting on importance of Model Regu-




223. The Declaration of Cartagena Concerning the Production of, Trafficking in
and Demand for Illicit Drugs, Feb. 15, 1990, State Dept. No. 90-88 KAV No. 2908,
available in 1990 WL 484467 (1990) [hereinafter Declaration of Cartagena].
224. See Lee, supra note 187, at 3-4 (discussing distinction between soft law, which
includes recommendations or reports for purpose of influencing governments to take
action, but are not binding, such as Basle Accords, and hard law, which is binding, most
commonly in form of treaties).
225. Declaration of Cartagena, supra note 223, at 1. The parties to the declaration
adopted a strategy aimed at implementing or strengthening a comprehensive program
that addressed demand reduction, consumption, and supply. Id. The strategy also ad-
dresses economic cooperation, alternative development, and encouragement of trade
and investment. Id. The parties acknowledged the interconnectedness of these areas
and that progress or failure in any one would necessarily effect the others. Id.
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the U.N. conventions and FATF and provided the groundwork
for subsequent international cooperation. 226 The United States
has also entered into a variety of mutual cooperation agree-
ments, understandings, and treaties with South American money
laundering centers such as Colombia,227 Chile,2 2 8 and Para-
guay.229 Some of the U.N. conventions' and FATF's suggestions,
which include language very similar to that found in the BSA,
have been incorporated into agreements between the United
States and Colombia, as well as between the United States and
Paraguay. 30
II. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT OF KYC
GUIDELINES AND THE REJECTION OF THE NEWLY
PROPOSED REGULATIONS
KYC guidelines, from which the proposed KYC regulations
emanate, have a long, hotly-debated history, which originated
with language in a legislative report on the BSA.231 The report
and the BSA, however, do not define the term "know your cus-
tomer" and do not give examples of what it means.23 2 KYC prin-
226. See, e.g., Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-06 (1994); see also
Guy C. Smith, The Andean Trade Preference Act, 21 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 149 (1992)
(commenting on elements of Andean Trade Preference Act ("ATPA"), which encour-
ages legitimate trade with Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador through economic in-
centives).
227. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Colombia, July 24, 1990, T.I.A.S. No. 12417,
available in 1990 WL 743729; Mutual Cooperation Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia to
Combat, Prevent, and Control Money Laundering Arising from Illicit Activities, Feb. 27
1992, U.S.-Colum., T.I.A.S. No. 12450, available in 1992 WL 465994 [hereinafter Co-
lombia Agreement].
228. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Chile, Aug. 5, 1994, available in 1994 WL 560659
[hereinafter Chile Agreement].
229. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Paraguay to Cooperate in the Prevention and Control
of Money Laundering Arising from Illegal Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic
Substances, Aug. 17, 1994, available in 1994 WIL 560684 [hereinafter Paraguay Agree-
ment].
230. See Colombia Agreement, supra note 227, art. 1(3), at 1 (defining reporting of
transactions similar to CTR reporting requirement); Paraguay Agreement, supra note
229, art. 1(2), at 1 (same).
231. See H.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 8 (1970) (mandating that insured banks keep
records of identities of each account holder and individual authorized to sign checks,
to make withdrawals, or to have any control over such accounts).
232. Lawrence S. Plave & Richard Fechter, The Ride Bankers Got On and Can't Get
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ciples, such as development of internal policies, procedures, and
controls, 213 designation of a compliance officer, 234 ongoing em-
ployee training programs,23 5 and independent audit function,236
however, are embodied in provisions of, and amendments to,
the BSA. 237 The lack of definitively articulated standards has
been one of the central criticisms of KYC policies since their in-
ception.23 8
A. The History of KYC Guidelines
On several occasions codification of KYC guidelines ap-
peared imminent. 239 The authority to promulgate KYC regula-
tion is vested in the U.S. Department of Treasury. 240 Although
KYC guidelines are not codified, the Treasury Department has
delegated authority241 to the federal banking agencies to require
banks to establish and maintain adequate internal compliance
programs to ensure conformity to the reporting requirements of
the BSA.242 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, law enforcement
Off, MONEY LAUNDERING, CYBERPAYMENTS, CORPORATE AND BANK SECURITY, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL CRIMES CONFERENCE, 295 (Oceana Publications, Inc., Feb. 20-21,
1997) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (arguing that proposed KYC
regulations may not be solution to current money laundering problem because they
remain too ambiguous for banking community to interpret reasonably).
233. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(a) (1994).
234. Id. § 5318(h)(1)(b).
235. Id. § 5318(h)(1)(c).
236. Id. § 5318(h)(1)(d).
237. See Id. § 5324 (prohibiting structuring of transactions); Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
238. See Plave & Fechter, supra note 232, at 296 (commenting on lack of specificity
concerning KYC principles and speculating that U.S. government keeps principles pur-
posely vague).
239. See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act Regulatory Applications to the Problem of Money
Laundering Through International Payments, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769, 45,771 (1989) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposing that model KYC procedures be employed
prior to origination of international wire transfers).
240. See S. RP. No. 101-460 (1990) (noting that Money Laundering Enforcement
Amendments of 1990 authorized U.S. Department of Treasury to promulgate regula-
tions to address money laundering through model KYC procedures); 136 CONG. REc.
S14465-01, S14466 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (explaining
that Department of Treasury should have authority to require financial institutions to
have stronger KYC procedures); In Brief Know Your Customer, 4 No. 20 DOJ ALERT 13
(1994) (Dept. ofJustice) (reporting that top anti-money laundering officials previewed
anticipated KYC regulations, which were expected but never issued by Department of
Tresury, at 1994 money laundering conference).
241. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (h)(1) (1994).
242. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (1999) (requiring all banks under supervision of OCC
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officials and the U.S. banking regulatory agencies promoted
KYC policies and procedures as one of the most effective ways
for banks to prevent money laundering 4 3 and to avoid liability
under money laundering laws.2 44
B. The Purpose of KYC Guidelines
KYC guidelines serve several purposes.24' First, they may de-
ter criminals posing as legitimate customers who would use fi-
to establish procedures for compliance with BSA). This provision states in pertinent
part:
(a) Purpose. This subpart is issued to assure that all national banks establish
and maintain procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor their
compliance with the requirements of subchapter II of chapter 53 of title
31, United States Code, and the implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder by the Department of Treasury at 31 CFR part 103.
(b) Compliance procedures. On or before April 27, 1987, each bank shall
develop and provide for the continued administration of a program rea-
sonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with the recordkeep-
ing and reporting requirements set forth in subchapter II of chapter 53 of
title 31, United States Code, and the implementing regulations promul-
gated thereunder by the Department of Treasury at 31 CFR Part 103. The
compliance program shall be reduced to writing, approved by the board
of directors and noted in the minutes.
(c) Contents of compliance program. The compliance program shall, at a
minimum:
(1) Provide for a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compli-
ance;
(2) Provide for independent testing for compliance to be conducted by
bank personnel or by an outside party;
(3) Designate an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating
and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and
(4) Provide training for appropriate personnel.
Id.
243. See Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, Bank
Secrecy Act Regulatory Applications to the Problem of Money Laundering Through
International Payments, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769, 45,771 (1989) (requesting that banks im-
pose KYC procedures for suspicious wire transfers); see also An Examiner's Guide to
Consumer Compliance, Bank Secrecy Act, available in 1993 WL 786985 (O.C.C.) [here-
inafter OCC Examiner's Guide] (providing guidance to bank examiners for examina-
tion of internal compliance programs required for banks to adhere to BSA). In 1993,
the OCC expanded application of this regulation by instructing its examiners to en-
courage banks to adopt KYC policies to assist in the reporting of suspicious transactions
and included specifics as to what adequate KYC policies should contain. OCC Exam-
iner's Guide, supra, at 6-7.
244. See Bennett et al., supra note 116, at 44 (commenting that government has
repeatedly emphasized that strong commitment to KYC programs is key to avoiding
problems associated with money laundering).
245. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 239 (commenting on underlying reasons for KYC
principles, noting that they are significant step in prevention of money laundering and
1999] KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER REGULATIONS 2361
nancial institutions as tools to launder proceeds from their illicit
activities.246 Second, strict adherence to KYC guidelines may re-
veal the illicit nature of a customer's business.247 Third, the in-
formation obtained from a customer will be transferred onto a
database that will indicate when transactions are inconsistent
with a customer's normal business transactions.248
The potential to generate immense profits is at the source
of drug trafficking and money laundering.249  Many experts
agree that the key stage to limit this potential is when the illicit
cash first enters the financial system. 250 The BSA, and the KYC
guidelines established thereunder, were designed to prevent en-
try of illicit funds into the system 251 and to keep banks from be-
coming unwitting participants in money laundering schemes. 52
KYC guidelines do so by requiring banks to obtain adequate in-
formation to determine the identity and legitimacy of their cli-
ents. 253 Many scholars and banking experts argue that a finan-
that they provide information needed for reporting requirement exemptions under
BSA).
246. See id. (noting that investigation of client might reveal services that they desire
are more consistent with needs of money laundering operation).
247. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 103, app. at 10 (1998) (suggesting that strong policies are
only way to reveal transactions inconsistent with customer profile).
248. Meltzer, supra note 3, at 239. For example, if a customer has a business that
requires a certain payroll disbursement on a bi-weekly basis and sudden withdrawals at
inconsistent time intervals occur, this activity could indicate that money laundering is
taking place. Id.
249. See H.R. REP. No. 101-446 at 21-22 (1990) (noting that street sales in United
States generate up to US$110 billion per year).
250. See id. (reporting that Congressional Banking Committee recognized impor-
tance of monitoring flow of money entering financial system when enacting BSA); see
also Statement by Edward W. Kelly, Jr., Member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US. House of Representatives, Feb. 28,
1996, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 322 [hereinafter Statement by Edward W Kelly, Jr.] (noting that
bank systems and bank employees are first and best line of defense against financial
crimes); Elizabeth Kingma, New Frontiers in the Regulation of International Money Movement
in the Wake of BCCI, 86 Am. Soc'Y Ir'L L. PROC. 188, 199 (1992) (opining that place-
ment is key stage in prevention of money laundering); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 231-32
(arguing that record keeping of cash transactions at point of entry into financial system
is necessary to successful anti-money laundering system).
251. See H.R. REp. No. 101-446, at 21-22 (discussing Congressional acknowledg-
ment that monitoring and reporting cash flows, as well as identifying illegal source of
funds, are important tools to thwart money launderers).
252. See Rudnick & Noonan, supra note 13, at 5 (reporting that banks are particu-
larly susceptible to abuse by financial criminals).
253. See id. (noting that customer profiles should be kept that are appropriate to
money laundering risks posed by particular customer or type of customer and their use
of bank products).
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cial institution with sound KYC guidelines in place will have the
ability to prevent the opening of fictitious accounts and will pro-
vide the financial institution with a customer profile that will en-
able it to predict, with relative certainty, the types of transactions
in which the customer is likely to engage.254
The ability of a financial institution, under a strong KYC
policy, to detect suspicious transactions has become one of the
most significant elements in the prevention of criminal activ-
ity.211 Capitalizing on the ability to detect suspicious transac-
tions, the Fed and other federal supervisory agencies required
banks to report suspected criminal activity,2 6 which has proven
to be somewhat effective.25 7  Congress, however, has acknowl-
edged that suspicious transaction reporting places a substantial
burden on financial institutions, 258 and the U.S. regulatory au-
thorities have made attempts to ease the burden of the reporting
requirements while maintaining the effectiveness of the re-
ports. 2
59
254. See Guidlines for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, supra note 7, at *2 (not-
ing that bank employee education programs are essential for proper administration of
KYC programs, particularly identification of suspicious transactions); see also Kingma,
supra note 250, at 200-01 (arguing for full or partial adoption of OAS Model Regula-
tions, which support both KYC programs and suspicious activity reporting); Shockey,
supra note 13, at 16-17 (contending that KYC programs promote basic safety and sound-
ness considerations and that identifying and reporting suspected criminal activity is one
of more significant elements of KYC program).
255. See Statement by Edward W Kelly, Jr., supra note 250, at 323-24 (commenting
that KYC policies are best way to prevent illicit funds from entering system and that
suspicious transaction reporting is essential element).
256. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (1994).
257. See Statement by Edward W Kelly, Jr., supra note 250, at 323-24 (noting that in
1995 more than 70,000 criminal referrals were filed).
258. See H.R. REP. No. 101-446, at 24 (1990) (noting that compliance with BSA is
difficult and costly, as staff must be trained to identify suspicious transactions and that
financial community, and taxpayers, must be reassured by government that filing of
over six million CTRs results in criminal liability for money launderers).
259. See Statement by Edward W Kelly, Jr., supra note 250, at 323-24 (commenting
that Fed and other federal bank supervisory agencies, along with U.S. Department of
Treasury, changed suspicious transaction criminal referral process, combining current
supervisory agency rules with Department of Treasury's suspicious-activity reporting re-
quirements). Additionally, a uniform inter-agency reporting form has reduced the
need for repetitive reports. Id. Banks will now also have the ability to use computer
software to help prepare magnetic filing of the reports. Id.; see Lee v. Bankers Trust
Company, 1999 WL 64633 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that safe harbor provision of 31
U.S.C. § 5318(g) provides unqualified privilege against liability for defamation or liable
for filing Suspicious Activity Report).
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C. Rejection of the Proposed KYC Regulations
On December 7, 1998, FDIC, OTS, the Fed, and OCC is-
sued proposed KYC regulations . 6  The shared goal of this in-
ter-agency effort was to protect the integrity of the financial insti-
tutions that each agency regulates. 261 Each agency believed that
the best way to effectuate this goal was to employ strong KYC
regulations.262 While the regulations issued by each agency were
substantially identical, 263 each agency promoted flexibility in
their own regulations to accommodate the different types of fi-
nancial institutions under their supervision. 264
Differences in language and emphasis aside, all of the regu-
lations included the same basic elements. 26 For example, each
proposal included the requirement that financial institutions de-
termine the true identity of the customer through proper identi-
260. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compli-
ance, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,529 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 326) (proposed Dec. 7,
1998); Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
563) (proposed Dec. 7, 1998); Membership of State Banking Institutions in the Federal
Reserve System; International Banking Operations; Bank Holding Companies and
Change in Bank Control, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,516 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
208, 211, 225) (proposed Dec. 7, 1998); "Know Your Customer" Requirements, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,524 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 21) (proposed Dec. 7, 1998).
261. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,516 (noting that Fed believed illicit financial activi-
ties such as money laundering undermine public's trust by marring reputation of finan-
cial institutions); see also id. at 67,525 (OCC proposal); id. at 67,530 (FDIC proposal);
id. at 67,536 (OTS proposal).
262. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,516 (stating that Fed has long advocated KYC policies as
one of most effective ways to thwart money laundering); see also id. at 67,525 (OCC
proposal); id. at 67,530 (FDIC proposal); id. at 67,536 (OTS proposal).
263. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,517; id. at 67,525; id.'at 67,530; id. at 67,536 (noting
that each of proposed rules, for instance, define customer in substantially following
language: "any person or entity who has an account involving the receipt or disbursal
of funds with an institution covered by this regulation and any person or entity on
behalf of whom an account is maintained").
264. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,537 (discussing OTS desire for individualized KYC
programs aimed at reflecting size, and complexity of savings association, type of cus-
tomer that OTS regulated savings associations serve, and risk of illicit activity); Steve
Cocheo, Bankers Slam Proposed Know Your Customer Rules, 2/1/99 A.B.A. BANKING J.,
available in 1999 WL 10893036 (noting that regulators avoided checklist approach to
KYC regulation because they did not believe "one size fits all").
265. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,516; id. at 67,524; id. at 67,534; see also Cocheo, supra
note 264, at 1 (noting that recent American Bankers Association analysis of inter-agency
proposed regulations include six basic elements: determining identity of customer; de-
termining source of customer funds; determining normal and expected transactions;
monitoring of customer transactions to determine whether transactions are normal or
expected; identifying abnormal or unexpected transactions; and determining whether
transaction is unusual or suspicious).
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fication documents266 and identify the source of the customer's
funds.26 7 Additionally, the failure of a financial institution to act
with due care with respect to KYC obligations could result in
both criminal and civil liability for the institution as well as its
officers and directors. 268 KYC requirements, if not strictly ad-
hered to, could result in convictions similar to those imposed for
violations of other provisions and amendments to the BSA.2 69
The burdens associated with criminal liability were only part
of the overwhelming negative reaction to the proposed regula-
tions.270 One bank vice-president believed that the complexity
of the issues raised by the KYC regulations would take great ef-
forts on the part of compliance officers and cause fundamental
changes in the way banks operate. 27 1 The vast majority of com-
266. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,519 (proposing that identification process be com-
mensurate with types of transactions that customer is involved in and risks associated
with such transactions); id. at 67,526 (noting that best identification is type most diffi-
cult to attain illegally and should include photograph and signature of customer); id. at
67,532 (stating that KYC compliance requirements for regulated, insured non-member
bank include determining to its own satisfaction that it is dealing with legitimate cus-
tomer and further identifying beneficial owners of private banking accounts such as
trusts and personal investment companies); id. at 67,538 (requiring proof of identity
that includes name, address, and place of business of customer and means of verifying
that information).
267. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,520 (proposing that understanding nature and
source of customer funds is essential to KYC program and can minimize potential crimi-
nal prosecution for avoidance of obtaining such information); id. at 67,527 (noting that
amount of information needed can depend on type of customer); id. at 67,532 (stating
that it may be beneficial to catagorize customers based on types of services used); id. at
67,539 (same).
268. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,520 (proposing that conforming to KYC program can
minimize potential criminal prosecution for avoidance of obtaining such information).
269. See United States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming convic-
tion of private banker based on KYC rules for accepting client on third party recom-
mendation alone and for failing to investigate client's source of funds); United States v.
Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1989)
(holding bank criminally liable for failure to file CTR under willful blindness standard).
270. FDIC - Know Your Customer Stats and Issues (visited Mar. 13, 1999) <http://
www.fdic.gov/banknews/customer.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter KYC Stats]. The FDIC received over 160,869 comments as of
March 5, 1999, only 45 in favor of the regulation with the remainder expressing vigor-
ous opposition to the proposal. Id. Comments, and the number of them, address cost
burden (4049), competitive disadvantage (2140), and ineffective crime measure
(5658). Id. Included among those making comments were individuals (153,377),
banks (6502), and law firms (139). Id.
271. See Money Laundering: Know Your Customer Proposed Rules Provoke Criticism, Com-
plaints from Banks, BNA BANKING DAILY NEws, Nov. 4, 1998 (reporting that Susan
Tucillo, vice-president and Senior Compliance Officer, Citibank, N.A.,jokingly referred
to proposed KYC regulations as "Compliance Officers' Guaranteed Employment Act of
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ments, however, both reflected the public's and the financial ser-
vice industry's concern that these KYC regulations would allow
the government to invade individual financial privacy.27 2 The in-
trusiveness of U.S. money laundering legislation has been criti-
cized in the past,2 7 and the overwhelming negative response to
these regulations encouraged Congressional leaders to propose
legislation that would either postpone codification or completely
abandon it.
274
The public at large and Congressional leaders were not
alone in opposition to the proposed regulations. 75 Leaders of
the regulatory agencies themselves expressed strong opinions
denouncing the regulations. 276 The view of the FDIC, given the
significant opposition to the regulations, was that if the proposal
was to become final, then it would not be in its then current
1998"). Ms. Tucillo feels the regulations create problems with almost every product
line that a bank provides. Id.; see Ali Sartipzadeh, Money Laundering: Bankers Urge Regu-
lators to Scrap 'Know Your Customer' Proposals, BNA BANKING DAILY NEWS, Feb. 1, 1999
(reporting that increased costs will accompany compliance and hurt smaller banks).
272. See KYC Stats, supra note 270 (observing that 99,522 comments focused on
privacy issues-97,568 from individuals, 1521 from banks); see also Irate Customers Food
Agencies over Proposed Regs, 9 No. 5 MONEYLAUNDERING L. REp. 1, Dec. 1998. [hereinafter
Irate Customers] (noting that majority of comments reflect fear of invasion of privacy by
government through proposed regulations that will legitimately intrude upon personal
lives of bank customers and use provided information without discretion).
273. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 236 (discussing BSA and other U.S. money
laundering regulations lack of protection of individuals financial privacy).
274. See 145 CONG. REc. E133-05 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Barr)
(introducing legislation that proposed KYC regulations should be delayed "until au-
thorized by Congress"); 145 CONG. REc. E155-05, E156 (daily ed. Feb. 8,1999) (state-
ment of Rep. Van Hilleary) (proposing Know Your Customer Program Abolishment Act
because KYC regulations invade privacy and intrude on individual liberties); 145 CONG.
REC. S1961-01 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (supporting
introduction of bill that would prohibit implementation of KYC regulations).
275. See Scott Barancik, ABA Urges Regulators to Strip Exams of Know-Your-Customer,
3/9/99 AM. BANKER 2, vol. 164, no. 45, Mar. 9, 1999 (noting that FDIC Chairman and
Comptroller of Currency, both oppose regulations).
276. See Testimony of Christie Sciacca, Associate Director Division of Supervision FDIC on
Proposed Regulation on "Know Your Customer" Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin-
istrative Law, Comm. on the Judiciay U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 4, 1999 (visited
Mar. 13, 1999) <http://www.fdic.gov/publish/speechs/99spchs/sp4mar.htnl> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Testimony of Christie Sciacca] (re-
marking that proposed regulations were inadequate in proposed form); see also Comp-
troller Says "Know Your Customer" Rule Should Be Rejected, Statement of John D. Hawke Jr.
(visited Mar. 13, 1999) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99-17.txt> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) (remarking that any marginal advantage gained
by law enforcement as result of regulations is far outweighed by potential for long-term
damage to banking system).
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form. 27 7 Although KYC guidelines were an essential element of
money laundering legislation in the past and have become de
facto regulation today,278 sentiment has abruptly shifted, disfavor-
ing of the KYC principles embodied in the proposed regula-
tions.279 The banking agencies' withdrawal of the proposed reg-
ulations, with little justification other than the overwhelmingly
negative comments, indicate that KYC guidelines fail to serve the
intended purpose of inhibiting money laundering, but leave
open the possibility that they may return in modified form.280
III. REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS IS
APPROPRIATE AND A LESS SPECIFIC SELF-REGULATORY
REGIME SHOULD BE ADOPTED BOTH IN THE US. AND THE
INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEMS
The rejection of the proposed regulations is the proper
move towards a generally-stated international regulatory scheme
concerning money laundering. As regulators retreat, the future
of the KYC regulations is unclear.281 Whether revamped KYC
regulations resurface or not, the issues that they have raised will
277. Testimony of Christie Sciacca, supra note 276.
278. See Barancik, supra note 275, at 1 (quoting American Bankers Association se-
nior counsel John J. Byrne, who stated that "[t]oday each bank must produce a know
your customer policy to the bank examiner even though there is no regulation mandat-
ing this"). John J. Byrne pointed out that most banks have already implemented volun-
tary KYC policies. Irate Customers, supra note 272, at 2. Mr. Byrne told the press, "John
Q. Citizen needs to recognize that there's nothing for him or her to worry about," as
the regulations are meant "simply to prevent fraud." Id.
279. See 145 CONG. Rc. H314-02, H317 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Paul) (comparing KYC regulations with violation of Fourth Amendment protection
against searches and seizures).
280. See Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compli-
ance, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (1999) (withdrawn Mar. 29, 1999) (noting that only 105
favorable comments out of 254,394 were received); see also Know Your Customer, 64
Fed. Reg. 14,845, 14,846 (1999) (withdrawn Mar. 29, 1999) (stating that proposed regu-
lations do not strike proper balance between privacy and financial burden concerns
and framework for banks to adhere to anti-money laundering statutes); Membership of
State Banking Institutions in the Federal Reserve System; International Banking Opera-
tions; Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 64 Fed. Reg. 15,310
(1999) (withdrawn Mar. 29, 1999) (enumerating specific concerns raised by comments
including cost of implementation). But see "Know Your Customer" Requirements, 64
Fed. Reg. 15,137 (1999) (withdrawn Mar. 29, 1999) (supporting KYC principles and
noting that national banks supervised by OCC already have programs in place that ac-
complish intended objectives of KYC principles).
281. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing withdrawal of KYC reg-
ulations without extensive comment by banking agencies).
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continue to plague the banking industry so long as the U.S.
money laundering legislation from which they emanate remains
intact.2 2 The U.S. government's expansive anti-money launder-
ing regulations 283 put U.S. financial institutions at a significant
competitive disadvantage in the international marketplace. 214
These institutions are ill-equipped to handle the regulatory bur-
dens that KYC regulations would impose.28 5 Government im-
posed KYC principles, whether codified or not, and their spread
through the international regulatory system,28 6 create inequities
between countries with weak banking systems and those with
strong banking systems. KYC regulations, furthermore, would
only increase burdens on U.S. financial institutions and create
significant inequities in the international banking system.
A. KYC Regulations Would Impose Too Significant a Burden on
U.S. Financial Institutions
A legitimate open market free of corruption brought on by
criminal elements is essential to a healthy banking system. 2 v
KYC regulations, by driving away legitimate international clients,
and particularly legitimate Latin American clients, 2 8 will artifi-
cially inhibit the flow of money to markets that adopt KYC prin-
ciples. 2 9 The ultimate result will be fewer resources to devote to
more practical efforts at eliminating money laundering. 290
While it would be difficult to estimate the costs involved in
strict adherence to ambiguous KYC guidelines embodied in the
282. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text (noting statute sections of BSA
that embody KYC principles).
283. See supra notes 68-127 and accompanying text (discussing details of BSA and
additional U.S. money laundering legislation).
284. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining costs imposed by U.S.
anti-money laundering regulation).
285. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (noting that FDIC survey indicated
that many bankers expressed concern over cost burden of proposed KYC regulation).
286. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting FATF recommendation
that KYC policies be implemented internationally).
287. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (explaining effect of Medellin
drug cartel's operations on Colombian economy).
288. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (remarking that Latin American
banking clients are resistant to intrusive regulation).
289. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (noting that legitimate funds as
well as illegitimate will flow to countries with strong privacy laws).
290. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (explaining that many negative
comments to proposed regulations centered on cost burden to banks and that added
costs would particularly hurt small banks by creating competitive disadvantage).
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proposed regulations, some experts believe that the costs are sig-
nificant and have criticized them as economically unworkable. 291
Not only are KYC regulations unworkable for U.S. financial
institutions, but they also create competitive disadvantages when
divergent regulatory schemes, particularly those of Latin
America, are involved.292 For example, Ecuador has become a
popular center for drug-related money laundering because it
borders traditionally identified money laundering countries
such as Peru and Columbia.2 9 Ecuador's exchange houses pro-
vide a convenient vehicle to cleanse illicit funds.2 94 In recent
years, banking laws in Ecuador have been amended and meas-
ures have been adopted to fight money laundering effected
through these channels, however, these changes include neither
KYC guidelines nor suspicious transaction reporting.295 What
appears to be a tightening of the regulatory scheme in Ecuador,
therefore, has the effect, when applied in conjunction with U.S.
regulations, of causing U.S. banks to compete at a competitive
disadvantage to Ecuadorian banks with respect to KYC guide-
lines and BSA suspicious transaction reporting. The ineffective-
ness of current reporting requirements296 should lead regulators
to conclude that the proposed KYC regulations should be cur-
tailed in order to enable banks to allocate resources where they
might deter money laundering more effectively and to allow
banks to compete equally in the international financial market-
place.
29 7
291. Smith, supra note 153, at 131.
292. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (noting recognition of problem
of lax banking standards in Latin America and need to address issue through Model
Regulations).
293. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing Adean region coun-
tries of Colombia and Peru as main source countries of Latin American drug trade).
294. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing use of exchange houses
to avoid regulation).
295. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that Ecuadorian law has
criminalized money laundering but has not enacted U.S. type anti-money laundering
legislation).
296. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (noting lack of effectiveness of
CTR reports).
297. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (suggesting that bankers may be
able to address money laundering issues more effectively if not for burden of reporting
requirements).
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B. KYC Regulations Imposed Internationally Are Not Feasible in, or
Equitable to, All Countries
A critical examination of the 1987 Conference, the 1988
Convention, and their predecessors298 reveals that the United
Nations is supporting an international anti-money laundering re-
gime that focuses on a move from very general towards very spe-
cific concepts.2 99 Support for this move continues to be found
in the specific recommendations of FATF300 and the Model Reg-
ulations issued by CICAD.30 1 While these efforts purport to en-
dorse general guidelines meant to fit the cultural, economic,
and political diversity of the countries that are party to them,30 2
these efforts have in fact incorporated very specific requirements
to satisfy their provisions.1° 3 Although many of these efforts are
not binding on the signatory countries3°4 and others such as the
Model Regulations and the Forty Recommendations are purely
suggestions, these efforts have found their way into binding doc-
uments. 30 5  The international community should consider
whether this is the best way to address the problem. Questions
of feasibility and equity must be answered before implementa-
tion of a tightly defined uniform international regime is
adopted.
1. KYC Regulation Is Not Feasible in All Countries
Not every country is equipped to handle the regulatory bur-
dens accompanying KYC regulation. U.S. legislation already
298. See supra notes 150-75 and accompanying text (examining evolution of U.N.
initiatives to prevent money laundering from 1961 through 1988).
299. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (noting requirement that party
states mandate their courts to produce bank records notwithstanding bank secrecy laws
under 1988 Convention).
300. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing specifics of Forty
Recommendations).
301. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting that Model Regulations
require banks to file reports similar to CTRs).
302. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (suggesting that Forty Recommen-
dation are intended to be flexible).
303. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (noting that FATF's Forty Rec-
ommendations include criminalization of money laundering, reporting requirements
very similar to those imposed by BSA and KYC programs).
304. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing non-binding nature
of Basle Committee's Minimum Standards).
305. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (noting that language very similar
to that found in BSA and suggested by U.N. Conventions and FATF is included in
agreements between United States and Colombia and United States and Paraguay).
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places too great a burden on financial institutions,3 °6 but none-
theless it is the single most significant influence on international
money laundering standards. 7 Incorporating tenets of U.S.
regulation into international binding regulation may not be fea-
sible in countries that have weak banking systems ill-equipped to
handle the burdensome requirements associated with such strict
regulation. 08
Because the Latin and South American drug trade gener-
ates such a large portion of illegally laundered money, interna-
tional money laundering efforts focus on these countries. 30 9 Be-
cause these efforts to incorporate KYC guidelines, 31' examina-
tion should be made of the effects of cumbersome regulations
on the banking systems of Latin American countries, which for
the most part, are historically weak. 311 For instance, some ex-
perts believe the lagging economies of Asia in the late 1990s is
directly related to the ineffectiveness of its banking system.312
The collapsing markets of Asia, led by Japan, can be partially
attributed to Japan's over-regulated, therefore weak, banking sys-
tem. To impose KYC regulation on Latin American countries
either will result in the same result as over-regulation in Japan,
increasing the already extensive economic strife,31 3 or will result
in lax adherence to standards, as was the case with BSA report-
ing requirements in this country.314
306. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing financial burden ac-
companied by U.S. reporting requirements)
307. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting, for example, incorpora-
tion of U.S. money laundering principles in Model Regulations).
308. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (noting that Latin American
countries such as Ecuador have lax banking standards possibly due in part to lack of
resources).
309. See supra notes 204-30 (discussing OAS, Model Regulations, and international
treaties and agreements with South American countries).
310. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting inclusion of KYC programs
in Model Regulations).
311. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining that Latin American
banking systems are part of problem of weak economies).
312. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (commenting that excessive regula-
tion has had detrimental effects on Japanese economy).
313. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (describing economic strife asso-
ciated with drug trade in Latin America).
314. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (noting administrative burdens
that led to lack of compliance with CTR reporting requirement and subsequent need to
bolster requirements through additional legislation).
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2. KYC Regulation Creates Inequities Among Countries with
Divergent Banking Systems
Binding agreements, made between countries with weak
banking systems, limited resources, and a lack of financial inde-
pendence, and countries with strong banking systems, large
amounts of financial resources, and divergent agendas concern-
ing money laundering, will inevitably lead to inequities. When
countries enter into binding agreements and treaties with one
another, the relative bargaining positions of those countries
should be considered. In the United States, political will has
been focused on the eradication of money laundering though
stringent regulation.315 The United States also provides signifi-
cant economic assistance to many of the countries where the
money laundering problem originates.316 Further, there is no
question that this assistance is sorely needed and is directly re-
lated to the problems posed by the drug trade in the assisted
countries. 1 7 When treaties are made between such countries,
there is an inherent inequality in bargaining position. The influ-
ence that U.S. legislation has had on such treaties is a clear indi-
cation that one party's goals may be given priority over the
others.31i Consequently, the countries that so desperately need
financial assistance from the United States are forced to acqui-
esce to stringent regulation that they may otherwise have
avoided. These countries are faced with the legitimate concern
that-their banking systems will be unable to support the weight
of such regulation, yet cannot forgo economic aid from the
United States.
CONCLUSION
The proposed KYC regulations were properly withdrawn.
Withdrawal, however, should be only the first step towards eradi-
cating KYC guidelines and principles in U.S. and international
315. See supra notes 68-127 (discussing BSA and additional U.S. anti-money laun-
dering legislation).
316. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (noting economic incentives are
given to Andean countries under Andean Trade Preference Act).
317. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (describing economic depen-
dance of Latin American countries on profits generated by drug trade).
318. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (noting inclusion of language
found in BSA in agreements between United States and Colombia and United States
and Paraguay).
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regulation. The U.S. government should examine the tradi-
tional concept of allowing banks to self-regulate. For most banks
it is simply prudent business to know one's customer.3 1 ' This is
not to say that self-regulation by itself will strike the proper bal-
ance. Perhaps expressly limiting the scope of KYC guidelines to
direct customers and making the guidelines clear as to what is
needed to comply, in place of the ambiguous language currently
under consideration would be a significant starting point.
The infiltration of KYC principles into the international reg-
ulatory framework will likely be curtailed in the wake of the re-
jection of the proposed regulations. Hopefully, this will be the
case, as imposition of international norms concerning the devel-
opment KYC principles may have wildly different and detrimen-
tal effects on the banking systems of financially weaker countries.
While uniform KYC standards applied in countries with strong
banking systems may be somewhat effective, they adversely effect
the soundness of countries with less developed banking systems.
Consideration must be given to a framework that allows coun-
tries to address the KYC issues in ways that their resources will
permit, not by having them adhere to blanket regulations im-
posed equally on unequal parties. The banking systems of less
stable countries should be allowed to grow unfettered by waste-
ful and ineffective regulation.
To a certain extent this type of international regime exists.
The flexible framework intended by the United Nations, FATF,
and CICAD, for instance, should be maintained. In the end,
specificity should give way to generality. Within that framework
KYC principles should be suggested, not mandated. A self-regu-
latory system that adheres to certain prudent KYC principles, but
that will allow nations the flexibility to address KYC issues in a
manner that is fair, efficient, and equitable will be most benefi-
cial to the entire international financial community.
319. See supra note 278 (noting that most banks have already implemented KYC
programs).
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